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THE THREE-JUDGE DISTRICT COURT
IN VOTING RIGHTS LITIGATIONt
Michael E. Solimine*
In recent Terms the Supreme Court has heard numerous appeals
from the decisions of three-judge district courts in controversial
Voting Rights Act cases as well as in challenges to congressional
districts designed allegedly to facilitate the election of members of
minority groups. Although the cases themselves have been followed
closely, the institution of the three-judge district court itself has
received relatively little attention, even though Congress passed
legislation in 1976 that restricted the three-judge court's jurisdiction
to reapportionment and certain Voting Rights Act cases. In this
Article, Professor Solimine argues that numerous problems attend
the formation and operation of such courts. He reviews both structur-
al problems and administrative problems. He concludes that the
court should be abolished, permitting a single district judge to
consider the cases currently litigated before such courts with normal
appellate review thereafter. He considers alternative reforms and
critically examines proposals to expand the current jurisdiction of
three-judge district courts.
[Aipportionment is a very high percentage of politics
with a very small admixture of definable principle.
-Alexander Bickel'
Legislative districting is highly political business.
-Justice Ruth Bader Ginsburg2
t © 1996 Michael E. Solimine, all rights reserved.
* Donald P. Klekamp Professor of Law, University of Cincinnati College of Law.
B.A. 1978, Wright State University; J.D. 1981, Northwestern University School of Law.
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States District Court for the Southern District of Ohio, and Pamela Karlan for discussing
the three-judge district court with me; Mark Chumley and Bryan Pacheco for their
research assistance; and Barry Friedman, Sam Issacharoff, Steve Justice, Judy
McKenna, Richard Pildes, Richard Saphire, and Joseph Tomain for commenting on an
earlier draft of this Article. I am particularly grateful to James Walker, not only for his
comments on an earlier draft, but for supplying me with information from the United
States Supreme Court Data Base.
1. Alexander Bickel, The Durability of Colegrove v. Green, 72 YALE L.J. 39, 42
(1962).
2. Miller v. Johnson, 115 S. Ct. 2475, 2499 (1995) (Ginsburg, J., dissenting), prob.
juris. noted sub nom. Abrams v. Johnson, 116 S. Ct. 1823 (1996).
80 University of Michigan Journal of Law Reform [VOL. 30:1
[T]hree-judge district courts [are] "a miserable way to
do business"-an "abomination," "a monstrosity in
concept and practice" ....
-- Judges of the United States Courts of Appeals3
INTRODUCTION
Within the last few years, the Supreme Court has handed
down a number of critical decisions in which issues of race or
voting rights, or both, were at the heart of the controversy.4 In
the 1994 Term, for example, the Court limited the power of
federal judges to desegregate public schools,5 subjected federal
affirmative action programs to heightened standards ofjudicial
scrutiny,6 and found racially gerrymandered congressional dis-
tricts unconstitutional. v The Court paid increased attention to
litigation that challenged congressional districts drawn to
increase the election chances of members of minority groups. By
the end of the 1995 Term, the Court had considered five such
challenges in a three-year period.'
What drew little, if any, attention was that all of these
gerrymandering cases did not reach the Supreme Court
through the usual process: a decision by a federal district
judge, with review by a court of appeals, followed by the Su-
preme Court's grant of a writ of certiorari. Rather, three-judge
district courts decided these cases, and the Supreme Court
provided direct review. Since Congress amended the statute
governing such tribunals in 1976, 9 three-judge courts have
3. J. WOODFORD HOWARD, JR., COURTS OF APPEALS IN THE FEDERAL JUDICIAL
SYSTEM: A STUDY OF THE SECOND, FIFTH, AND DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA CIRCUITS 282-83
(1981) (quoting the author's study of circuit judge opinions on this and other subjects).
4. See generally Charles Fried, The Supreme Court, 1994 Term-Foreword:
Revolutions?, 109 HARV. L. REV. 13 (1995).
5. See Missouri v. Jenkins, 115 S. Ct. 2038, 2054-56 (1995) (finding that allowing
salary increases for the purpose of "desegregation attractiveness" was an interdistrict
solution beyond the scope of the problem).
6. See Adarand Constructors, Inc. v. Pefia, 115 S. Ct. 2097, 2112 (1995) (applying
strict scrutiny to race-based allocation of federal highway contracts).
7. See Miller, 115 S. Ct. at 2490 (requiring that congressional redistricting pass
strict scrutiny).
8. See Bush v. Vera, 116 S. Ct. 1941 (1996); Shaw v. Hunt, 116 S. Ct. 1894 (1996);
Miller, 115 S. Ct. at 2475; United States v. Hays, 115 S. Ct. 2431 (1995); Shaw v. Reno,
509 U.S. 630 (1993).
9. See 28 U.S.C. § 2284 (1994); see also infra Part I.B.
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operated in comparative anonymity. They should not. Although
these courts now only decide reapportionment and certain
Voting Rights Act1° claims, 1 they nonetheless supply the Su-
preme Court with many cases involving increasingly volatile
voting rights issues. 2 These cases significantly affect the
functioning of the American political system. Reapportionment,
apportionment, and Voting Rights Act cases challenge the
decennial configuration of electoral districts for the U.S. House
of Representatives and state legislative bodies. In these types
of cases, courts often find the districting plan established by a
state legislature unlawful and order the districts redrawn.'3 Yet,
despite the important issues resolved by three-judge district
courts, the convening and operation of these courts has received
comparatively little notice.'
4
10. 42 U.S.C. §§ 1971, 1973 to 1973bb-1 (1994).
11. See 28 U.S.C. § 2284(a) (1994).
12. In the 1995 Term, the Court also heard a Voting Rights Act case not involving
alleged racial gerrymandering of legislative districts. See Morse v. Republican Party,
116 S. Ct. 1186 (1996) (determining the extent to which jurisdictions covered by section
5 of the Voting Rights Act can change electoral practices without prior approval of the
U.S. Attorney General).
By the end of the 1995 Term, the Court had agreed to consider three cases arising
from three-judge district courts for the 1996 Term. See Johnson v. Miller, 922 F. Supp.
1556 (S.D. Ga.) (concerning the court's redrawing of congressional districts after Miller,
115 S. Ct. 2475, prob. juris. noted sub nom. Abrams v. Johnson, 116 S. Ct. 1823 (1996));
Bossier Parish Sch. Bd. v. Reno, 907 F. Supp. 434 (D.D.C. 1995) (concerning interaction
of sections 2 and 5 of the Voting Rights Act), rev'd, 117 S. Ct. 340 (1996); Lopez v.
Monterey, 871 F. Supp. 1254 (N.D. Cal. 1994) (concerning remedies under the Voting
Rights Act and judicial elections), prob. juris. noted, 116 S. Ct. 1349, rev'd, 117 S. Ct.
340 (1996). Undoubtedly, many of the racial gerrymandering cases now being litigated
in three-judge district courts will appear on the Court's docket before the end of the
decade. See Bush, 116 S. Ct. at 1991 (1996) (Stevens, J., dissenting) (predicting that
"[sitates may find it extremely difficult to avoid litigation flowing from decennial
redistricting"); Juliana Gruenwald, Several Minority-Majority Districts Still Face
Constitutional Challenges, 54 CONG. Q. 456, 456-57 (1996) (describing litigation in
Florida, Georgia, Illinois, Louisiana, New York, North Carolina, Texas, and Virginia);
see, e.g., Scott v. Department ofJustice, 920 F. Supp. 1248 (M.D. Fla.) (concerning, inter
alia, alleged racial gerrymandering of state legislative districts in Florida), prob. juris.
noted sub nom. Lawyer v. Department of Justice, 117 S. Ct. 292 (1996); King v. State
Bd. of Elections, No. 95-C-827, 1996 WL 130439 (N.D. Ill. Mar. 15, 1996) (concerning
alleged racial gerrymandering of a congressional district in Illinois), vacated, 117 S. Ct.
429 (1996).
13. See generally DANIEL HAYS LOWENSTEIN, ELECTION LAW 71-72, 101-04 (1995)
(discussing reapportionment litigation); id. at 30-32, 143-257 (discussing Voting Rights
Act litigation).
14. At the same time, there has been considerable scholarly discussion of the
substantive issues raised by the recent decisions of three-judge district courts, particular-
ly those decisions concerning alleged racial gerrymandering. See, e.g., Conference
Commemorating the 30th Anniversary of the Voting Rights Act of 1965, 26 CUMB. L. REV.
287 (1996); Symposium, Race Consciousness and the Law of Elections, 44 EMORY L.J.
827 (1995); Symposium, Voting Rights and Elections, 1995 U. CHI. LEGAL F. 1; Voting
Rights Symposium, 65 MiSS. L.J. 205 (1995).
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This Article addresses the operation of three-judge district
courts in the last two decades. Part I reviews the general
background of such courts, beginning with their birth in 1910
as a reaction to injunctions granted against state governments
by individual federal judges, to the curtailment of the jurisdic-
tion of such courts sixty-five years later. Part I also briefly
reviews the effect of a 1976 statutory amendment on three-judge
court litigation.
The second Part of this Article considers structural aspects of
the modern three-judge district court. That is, Part II addresses
legal and policy issues apparent from or inherent in the govern-
ing statute.15 Part II first considers several issues of statutory
interpretation left in the wake of the 1976 amendment. It then
focuses on the aforementioned jurisdictional coverage of the
statute, now restricted to issues regarding the apportionment
of congressional districts or state-wide legislative bodies (or
when required by an Act of Congress).16 This Part addresses how
Voting Rights Act cases are heard despite this restriction and
whether the restriction makes good policy sense. Part II further
considers whether the statute can achieve its purpose of thwart-
ing forum shopping by plaintiffs seeking a single sympathetic
judge. Finally, Part II reviews and offers a critique of the pro-
cess of direct review by the Supreme Court.
Part III of the Article turns to issues emanating from the
staffing and administration of three-judge courts. This section
initially considers the unusual makeup of each particular three-
judge court-a combination of district judges and at least one
circuit judge, with the chief judge of the circuit selecting two of
the members. 17 This procedure raises the possibility of a chief
judge "stacking" the membership of a three-judge panel. On a
related note, this section discusses the internal dynamics of
decisionmaking on three-judge courts, with a consideration of
whether district judges defer to their circuit counterparts, and
whether ideological motivations help explain voting patterns in
these cases. Part III concludes with a brief discussion of the
logistics of litigating voting rights cases before a multi-member
trial court.
The fourth Part of the Article reviews proposals to change the
status quo. Most of these proposals suggest further curtailing,
15. See 28 U.S.C. § 2284.
16. See id. § 2284(a).
17. See id. § 2284(b)(1).
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or entirely eliminating, the jurisdictional ambit of such courts
or changing the membership and appellate review of such
courts. Conversely, the 104th Congress enacted into law one of
two proposals to expand the jurisdiction of these courts.1 8 The
Article concludes by asking whether and to what extent an
institution asked to review highly controversial and sensitive
political issues has, itself, become politicized and what can or
should follow by way of reform.
I. BACKGROUND
A. History of the Three-Judge District Court
The colorful history of the statutory three-judge district court19
has been recounted elsewhere" and need not be described here
in great detail. Prior to this century Congress occasionally
created three-judge trial courts,2" but the widespread use of such
courts began in reaction to the Supreme Court's decision in 1908
in Ex parte Young.22 Charles Alan Wright described the case as
one of the "three most important decisions the Supreme Court
of the United States has ever handed down,"23 because it estab-
lished the power of federal courts to enjoin the actions of state
officials when violative of the federal constitution. The Court
18. See Prison Litigation Reform Act of 1995, Pub. L. No. 104-134, § 802(a), 110
Stat. 1321 (1996) (to be codified at 18 U.S.C. § 3626(a)(3)(B)) (requiring a three-judge
court to order prisoner release); see also H.R. 1170, 104th Cong. (1995) (requiring a
three-judge district court to be convened whenever a state-wide referendum is challenged
in court).
19. On occasion a district court has been constituted informally to consist of three
members, but the power of such a court, and review thereof, is typically equivalent to
that of a single district judge. See King v. Champion, 55 F.3d 522 (10th Cir. 1995)
(describing briefly the creation of such a court). See generally Comment, In Search of
Judicial Economy: The Non-Statutory Three Judge Court, 56 IOWA L. REV. 1096 (1971)
(discussing the confusion that use of a non-statutory three-judge district can cause).
20. For a thorough review, see 17 CHARLES ALAN WRIGHT ET AL., FEDERAL PRACTICE
AND PROCEDURE: JURISDICTION § 4234 (2d ed. 1988); David P. Currie, The Three-Judge
District Court in Constitutional Litigation, 32 U. CHI. L. REV. 1, 1-8 (1964).
21. See Currie, supra note 20, at 1-2 (describing its use in certain antitrust cases
and appeals from federal administrative agencies).
22. 209 US. 123 (1908).
23. WRIGHT ET AL., supra note 20, § 4231, at 559 (footnote omitted). Wright de-
scribed Exparte Young as being as important as Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. (1 Cranch)
137 (1803) (establishing power ofjudicial review) and Martin v. Hunter's Lessee, 14 U.S.
(1 Wheat.) 304 (1816) (holding that the Supreme Court could enforce the federal
Constitution against state courts). See WRIGHT ET AL., supra note 20, § 4231, at 559.
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held that federal judges could exercise such power despite the
purported barrier of the Eleventh Amendment,24 because when
a state official acted unconstitutionally, his actions stripped him
of his official capacity. The Eleventh Amendment would not,
therefore, protect him.25
The spectacle of federal judges enjoining the new regulatory
policies of states engendered much criticism in the Progressive
Era of 1908.26 In Congress, one senator opined that he was
"opposed to allowing one little federal judge to stand up against
the governor and the legislature and the attorney-general of the
State and say, 'This act is unconstitutional.' , 27 In 1910 Congress
passed legislation that required parties seeking relief against
state officials, like the suit in Exparte Young, to bring their suit
before a district court consisting of three judges.28 At least one
of the judges had to be from the federal circuit appeals court and
direct review by appeal would lie in the Supreme Court.29 This
format was designed to encourage greater deliberation among
three minds before a grant of injunctive relief, to lend greater
dignity to the proceedings, and to provide expedited Supreme
Court correction, if necessary.3"
In the following decades, the role of the three-judge court
expanded.3 Most notably, a 1925 amendment included suits
seeking both interlocutory and permanent injunctive relief,3 2 and
another in 1937 extended coverage to suits that challenged the
constitutionality of a congressional statute.3 Whatever the
wisdom of these extensions, the goals of restricting the power
of federal judges acting alone "was attained only at great
24. See U.S. CONST. amend. XI ("The Judicial power of the United States shall not
be construed to extend to any suit in law or equity, commenced or prosecuted against
one of the United States by Citizens of another State, or by Citizens of any Foreign
State.").
25. See Ex parte Young, 209 U.S. at 159-60. Ex parte Young has remained an
integral part of the Court's Eleventh Amendment jurisprudence. See, e.g., Seminole Tribe
v. Florida, 116 S. Ct. 1114, 1132-33 (1996). See generally ERWIN CHEMERINSKY, FEDERAL
JURISDICTION 390-401 (2d ed. 1994).
26. See Currie, supra note 20, at 5-6.
27. Id. at 7 n.40 (quoting 45 CONG. REc. 7256 (1910) (statement of Sen. Overman)).
28. See Act of June 18, 1910, ch. 309, 36 Stat. 539, 557 (codified at 18 U.S.C. § 2284
(1994)).
29. See id.
30. See WRIGHT ET AL., supra note 20, § 4235, at 596-98; Currie, supra note 20, at
7-8.
31. See WRIGHT ET AL., supra note 20, § 4235, at 596-603.
32. See Act of Feb. 13, 1925, ch. 229, 43 Stat. 936, 938.
33. See Act of Aug. 24, 1937, ch. 753, 50 Stat. 751, 752 (codified at 1948 Judicial
Code § 2282).
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price."34 The price was paid in two ways. First, convening ad hoc
three-judge trial courts burdened the lower federal judiciary.35
The ostensibly direct and mandatory review function meant that
in some years such appeals took up nearly a quarter of the
Supreme Court's docket.3" Second, the operation of the statutory
provisions produced a confusing array of issues regarding when
such courts had to be convened.37 Finally, the rules that ad-
dressed appellate review of orders by or about such courts "were
so complex as to be virtually beyond belief."3 8
B. The 1976 Amendment
The complexities of the three-judge district court were not lost
upon policymakers. By the 1960s commentators suggested
curtailing the court or eliminating it entirely. Professor David
Currie, in a 1964 article, acknowledged that the court might be
appropriate for cases with high potential for federal-state
friction.39 At the same time he argued that the normal appellate
process should operate unless the court issued an injunction, in
which instance there could be a direct appeal.4 ° Similarly, the
American Law Institute (ALI) cautioned that with the volatile
political issues considered by such courts, "procedural efficiency
cannot be the only determinant of when to require three judg-
es."4' Nonetheless, the ALI concluded that the original reasons
for the three-judge court no longer existed. Modern rules of
34. WRIGHT ET AL., supra note 20, § 4234, at 600.
35. See Phillips v. United States, 312 U.S. 246, 250 (1941).
36. See Symposium, The Freund Report: A Statistical Analysis and Critique, 27
RUTGERS L. REV. 878, 902 (1974) (noting that during the 1972 Term, appeals from three-
judge district courts accounted for more than 23% of the Supreme Court's docket), cited
in Gonzalez v. Automatic Employees Credit Union, 419 U.S. 90, 98 n.16 (1974).
37. See WRIGHT ET AL., supra note 20, § 4234, at 601.
38. Id. Among the complicated issues were whether and to what extent the district
judge could issue orders, whether the district judge or a circuit judge would convene the
three-judge court, Whether a litigant motion was necessary to instigate the convention,
and whether there were the appellate consequences of an incorrectly convened three-
judge court or one that had not been convened when it should have. See id.; see also
Currie, supra note 20.
39. See Currie, supra note 20, at 75 (referring to "[race-relations and reapportion-
ment cases").
40. See id. at 76.
41. AMERICAN LAW INST., STUDY OF THE DIVISION OF JURISDICTION BETWEEN STATE
AND FEDERAL COURTS 318-19 (1969).
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procedure safeguarded against district judges granting precipi-
tous ex parte injunctions, and the "image of the federal courts
as a barrier against liberal state legislation ha[d] long since
disappeared."42 Moreover, in the 1960s hundreds of such cases
were heard each year.43 Still, the ALI did not call for the court's
abolition. Noting that the "moral authority of a federal court
order is likely to be maximized" by a three-judge panel,44 the
ALI recommended using three-judge panels for "important"
cases.45 While the ALI acknowledged that "important" was a
difficult standard to define, they suggested that a good starting
point would be cases with state-wide significance." The ALI
concluded that the three-judge procedure with direct review
should only operate when the constitutionality of a state statute
was attacked.47 A single judge would hear challenges to federal
statutes.48
By the early 1970s the Judicial Conference of the United
States and other authorities were advocating either total repeal
or ALI-like restrictions. 49 Judge J. Skelly Wright placed himself
in the camp of supporting some restrictions and approved of a
bill5" to limit three-judge courts to reapportionment cases.51 He
argued that such cases were ones of "'great public concern'
that require an unusual degree of "'public acceptance"' and
ordinarily would present legal issues based on undisputed
statistical facts.52 In the camp favoring complete repeal, Profes-
sor Charles Alan Wright was skeptical. He conceded that
reapportionment cases are important, but suggested that such
cases are likely to be fact-intensive, and thus particularly
unsuitable for decision by three triers of fact.53
42. Id. at 319.
43. See id. at 317.
44. Id. at 320. The ALI reasoned that a court's moral authority was increased "if
the result cannot be laid to the prejudices or political ambitions of a single district
judge." Id.
45. Id.
46. See id. at 321.
47. See id. at 53-56.
48. See id. at 317.
49. For a good summary of the debate over the three-judge court proposals in the
early 1970s, see Sidney B. Jacoby, Recent Proposals and Legislative Efforts to Limit
Three-Judge Court Jurisdiction, 26 CASE W. REs. L. REv. 32 (1975).
50. See S. 1876, 92d Cong. § 1374 (1971).
51. See Jacoby, supra note 49, at 39.
52. Id. (quoting Hearings on S. 1876 Before the Subcomm. on Improvements in
Judicial Mach. of the Senate Comm. on the Judiciary, 92d Cong. 791 (1971-72)
[hereinafter Hearings] (statement of Hon. J. Skelly Wright)).
53. See Hearings, supra note 52, at 774 (statement of Prof. Charles Alan Wright).
FALL 19961 Voting Rights and Three-Judge District Courts 87
Judge Wright's position prevailed in the ninety-fourth Con-
gress. Legislation54 repealed prior statutes and codified the
three-judge court in section 2284 of the Judicial Code.55 As
amended, section 2284 mandates that three-judge courts shall
be convened "when an action is filed challenging the constitu-
tionality of the apportionment of congressional districts or the
apportionment of any statewide legislative body," or when
otherwise required by a separate statute.56 Section 1253 of the
Code, which provided for direct review to the Supreme Court,
remained intact.
57
54. See Act of Aug. 12, 1976, Pub. L. No. 94-381, § 3, 90 Stat. 1119.
55. 28 U.S.C. § 2284 (1994). Section 2284 provides:
(a) A district court of three judges shall be convened when otherwise required
by Act of Congress, or when an action is filed challenging the constitutionality of
the apportionment of congressional districts or the apportionment of any statewide
legislative body.
(b) In any action required to be heard and determined by a district court of three
judges under subsection (a) of this section, the composition and procedure of the
court shall be as follows:
(1) Upon the filing of a request for threejudges, thejudge to whom the request
is presented shall, unless he determines that three judges are not required,
immediately notify the chiefjudge of the circuit, who shall designate two other
judges, at least one of whom shall be a circuit judge. The judges so designated,
and the judge to whom the request was presented, shall serve as members of
the court to hear and determine the action or proceeding.
(2) If the action is against a State, or officer or agency thereof, at least five
days' notice of hearing of the action shall be given by registered or certified mail
to the Governor and attorney general of the State.
(3) A single judge may conduct all proceedings except the trial, and enter all
orders permitted by the rules of civil procedure except as provided in this
subsection. He may grant a temporary restraining order on a specific finding,
based on evidence submitted, that specified irreparable damage will result if
the order is not granted, which order, unless previously revoked by the district
judge, shall remain in force only until the hearing and determination by the
district court of three judges of an application for a preliminary injunction. A
single judge shall not appoint a master, or order a reference, or hear and
determine any application for a preliminary or permanent injunction or motion
to vacate such an injunction, or enter judgment on the merits. Any action of a
single judge may be reviewed by the full court at any time before final judgment.
Id.
56. Id. § 2284(a).
57. Section 1253 governs direct appeals from decisions of three-judge courts:
Except as otherwise provided by law, any party may appeal to the Supreme Court
from an order granting or denying, after notice and hearing, an interlocutory or
permanent injunction in any civil action, suit or proceeding required by any Act
of Congress to be heard and determined by a district court of three judges.
28 U.S.C. § 1253 (1994).
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The legislative record provides the rationale for the partial
repeal. The Senate Judiciary Committee advanced four principal
reasons in support of the change. First, there was the consider-
able logistical burden of convening a large number of such
panels-reaching an all-time high of 320 in 1973.58 Second,
amendments were necessary to cure some procedural uncertain-
ties of the prior statute.5 9 Third, changes in procedural practice
had largely "eliminated the original reasons" for the stat-
ute60 -such as limits on the granting of ex parte injunctive
orders.6' Finally, the Committee observed that modern case law
placed equitable restraints on the authority of federal judges to
grant injunctive relief against state programs or officials.62
Nonetheless, the Committee added, without elaboration:
The bill preserves three-judge courts for cases involving
congressional reapportionment or the reapportionment of a
statewide legislative body because it is the judgment of the
committee that these issues are of such importance that they
ought to be heard by a three-judge court and, in any event,
they have never constituted a large number of cases.63
Completely agreeing with the earlier-stated views of the
Senate Judiciary Committee," the Report added that "[a]lthough
the NAACP has spoken in opposition to restriction of three-judge
court jurisdiction, the Committee is satisfied that the civil rights
of citizens will continue to be well protected by this bill."65
Representative Robert Drinan from Massachusetts elaborated
on this point. He observed that the only explicit opposition to
the retraction of three-judge district court jurisdiction came from
58. See S. REP. No. 94-204, at 4 (1975), reprinted in 1976 U.S.C.C.A.N. 1988, 1991.
59. See id. at 5-7. The report refers to, among other things, questions of what was
a state statute, and the implications of a district judge refusing to convene a three-judge
court, if that action was later determined by an appellate court to be incorrect. See id.
60. Id. at 4.
61. See id. at 7-8. Senate Report 204 observes that the revision of the Federal
Equity Rules in 1912 placed limits on the granting and duration of ex parte restraining
orders, while other statutes, like the Johnson Act of 1934, 28 U.S.C. § 1342 (1988), and
the Tax Injunction Act of 1937, 28 U.S.C. § 1341 (1988), placed limits on the granting
of injunctive relief by federal courts against state public utility and tax authorities. See
S. REP. No. 94-204, at 7-8.
62. See S. REP. No. 94-204, at 8 (referring to, among other cases, Younger v. Harris,
401 U.S. 37 (1971)).
63. Id. at 9.
64. See H.R. REP. No. 94-1379, at 1-4 (1976).
65. Id. at 4.
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the NAACP, which argued that such courts were needed to
protect minorities "from the local bias and parochialism of some
federal judges" and that abolition would send the wrong signal
with regard to the nation's commitment to civil rights enforce-
ment.66 Representative Drinan took issue with both claims,
arguing that the former proved too much because if it were true,
all racial discrimination cases should be before three-judge
courts and that the latter concerns were addressed by the
retention of jurisdiction over certain voting rights cases.67 The
opposition of the NAACP had not been in vain, however, because
the partial repeal was evidence of a legislative "compromise," as
Drinan labeled it elsewhere.68
C. Use of the Three-Judge District Court Since 1976
Since 1976, three-judge district courts are convened for cases
challenging a state's reapportionment of its federal and state
legislative districts, and in other instances when required by
Congress.6 9 Among the most important of the latter are the
66. Id. at 13-14 (statement of Rep. Robert Drinan).
67. See id. at 14.
68. 122 CONG. REC. 25,058 (1976) (statement of Rep. Robert Drinan). In the 1970s
the NAACP and other civil rights organizations also opposed the breakup of the old Fifth
Circuit into two new circuits. These groups felt that the Fifth Circuit, like the institution
of the three-judge district court, had been hospitable to their interests. The election of
President Jimmy Carter, the support of Fifth Circuitjudges, and other factors alleviated
fears surrounding this proposed change, and legislation to split the old Fifth Circuit into
the Fifth and Eleventh Circuits was enacted in 1980. See Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals
Reorganization Act of 1980, Pub. L. No. 96-452, 94 Stat. 1994 (codified as amended at
28 U.S.C. § 41 (1994)); DEBORAH J. BARROW & THOMAS G. WALKER, A COURT DIVIDED:
THE FIFTH CIRCUIT COURT OF APPEALS AND THE POLITICS OF JUDICIAL REFORM 194-96,
239, 241 (1988); DENTON L. WATSON, LION IN THE LOBBY: CLARENCE MITCHELL, JR.'S
STRUGGLE FOR THE PASSAGE OF CIVIL RIGHTS LAWS 735 (1990). I thank Judge Nathaniel
Jones for bringing this history to my attention.
69. Among the other scenarios that require three-judge district courts are those that
involve certain actions by. the Attorney General to enforce the Civil Rights Act of 1964,
42 U.S.C. §§ 2000a-5(b), 2000e-6(b) (1994) (public accommodations and equal employ-
ment); the Voting Rights Act, 42 U.S.C. §§ 1973aa-2, 1973bb(a)(2) (1994) (enforcing the
26th Amendment); see also WRIGHT ET AL., supra note 20, § 4235, at 604-05.
Congress recently authorized a three-judge district court to test the constitutionality
of the Cable Television Consumer Protection and Competition Act, 47 U.S.C. § 555(c)(1)
(1994). See Turner Broad. Sys., Inc. v. FCC, 819 F. Supp. 32 (D.D.C.),prob.juris. noted,
509 U.S. 952 (1993), vacated, 114 S. Ct. 2445 (1994), prob. juris. noted, 116 S. Ct. 907
(1996). It is unclear why the challenge to this Act necessitated a hearing before a three-
judge court. The legislative history is unhelpful. See S. REP. NO. 102-92, at 91 (1992),
reprinted in 1992 U.S.C.C.A.N. (106 Stat. 1460) 1133, 1224 (describing three-judge
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preclearance provisions of the Voting Rights Act, ° under which
certain political subdivisions in the South 71 must seek permis-
sion from the U.S. Department of Justice (DOJ) before changing
election processes. Part of that approval procedure may entail
a hearing before a three-judge district court convened in the
District of Columbia.72 While § 2284 makes no mention of
private enforcement of the Voting Rights Act, courts have
routinely exercised pendent jurisdiction over such claims when
joined with actions explicitly calling for a three-judge court to
be empaneled.73
The drafters of the 1976 Amendment accurately predicted that
the number of three-judge court cases would fall drastically. As
Table 1 indicates, the number of three-judge court hearings, 4
which reached more than 300 annually shortly before the
amendment, fell well below 100 annually by the 1980s. Indeed,
the annual number of such hearings is usually between ten and
district court provision without elaboration); H. CONF. REP. No. 102-862, at 98 (1992),
reprinted in 1992 U.S.C.C.A.N. 1231, 1280 (same). Perhaps the drafters felt that the
uncertainty generated by a legal challenge was particularly inappropriate for legislation
affecting so many persons and that the three-judge court would hasten eventual review
by the Supreme Court. See Linda Greenhouse, Justices Reconsider Law Requiring Cable
TV to Carry Local Stations' Signals, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 21, 1996, at A16 (characterizing
the three-judge panel as a "special court, authorized by Congress to provide a speedy
constitutional review of a law with evident constitutional vulnerabilities"). Similar
concerns probably animated like provisions found in, for example, the Balanced Budget
and Emergency Deficit Control (Gramm-Rudman-Hollings) Act, 2 U.S.C. § 922 (1994)
(applied in Synar v. United States, 626 F. Supp. 1374 (D.D.C.), affd sub nom. Bowsher
v. Synar, 478 U.S. 714 (1986)); Presidential Election Campaign Fund Act, 26 U.S.C.
§ 9011(b)(2) (1994) (applied in Common Cause v. Schmitt, 512 F. Supp. 489 (D.D.C.
1980), affd, 455 U.S. 129 (1982)); Communications Decency Act of 1996, Pub. L. No. 104-
104, § 561, 110 Stat. 142-43, to be codified at 47 U.S.C. § 561, construed in ACLU v.
Reno, 929 F. Supp. 824 (E.D. Pa. 1996), prob.juris. noted, 65 U.S.L.W. 3414 (U.S. Dec.
10, 1996) (No. 96-511).
70. 42 U.S.C. §§ 1973b(a), 1973c (1994).
71. Currently, Alabama, Alaska, Arizona, Georgia, Louisiana, Mississippi, South
Carolina, Texas, Virginia, and parts of North Carolina are covered by section 5. See 28
C.F.R. § 51 app. (1994). The section has been extended periodically by legislation and
presently expires in 2007. See 42 U.S.C. § 1973b(a)(8).
72. For a discussion of preclearance procedures and litigation, see Drew S. Days
III & Lani Guinier, Enforcement of Section 5 of the Voting Rights Act, in MINORITY VOTE
DILUTION 167 (Chandler Davidson ed., 1984); Drew S. Days III, Section 5 and the Role
of the Justice Department, in CONTROVERSIES IN MINORITY VOTING: THE VOTING RIGHTS
ACT IN PERSPECTIVE 52 (Bernard Grofman & Chandler Davidson eds., 1992).
73. For further discussion of this jurisdictional point, see infra notes 105-13 and
accompanying text.
74. The Annual Reports of the Director of the Administrative Office of the United
States Courts, the source of the data in Table 1, refer to "hearings," not to filed cases.
The two are not necessarily equivalent. Even if a three-judge district court is convened,
the case may be dismissed or otherwise terminated without any sort of hearing.
Likewise, any such case presumably can have more than one hearing.
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twenty, except for the years 1982 and 1992, when the totals
were sixty-two and forty-nine, respectively.
It is easy to establish the subject of these cases. Three-judge
courts rarely are convened except for cases that involve reappor-
tionment and pendent Voting Rights Act litigation.75 The up-
surge in the number of cases in the early years of the decades
is no surprise, given that reapportionment by states, which
takes place decennially76 was judicially challenged in more than
one-third of the states in the 1980s and in about two-thirds of
the states in the 1990s.7 The balance of the cases,7" as indicated
in Table 1, arose from litigation by the federal government or
private litigants to enforce the primary provisions of the Voting
Rights Act.
The substantive law driving these currents of litigation is well
known. Since the 1960s, reapportionment jurisprudence has
been relatively well settled,79 and modern cases involve mostly
75. See WRIGHT ET AL., supra note 20, § 4234, at 604-05 (discussing circumstances
under which three-judge district courts are convened); Days, supra note 72, at 52 n.2
(noting the paucity of three-judge court litigation under preclearance provisions of the
Voting Rights Act); Pamela S. Karlan, All Over the Map: The Supreme Court's Voting
Rights Trilogy, 1993 SuP. CT. REV. 245, 272 (same); see also Morse v. Republican Party,
116 S. Ct. 1186, 1224 n.2 (1996) (Thomas, J., dissenting) (pointing out that every year
'at least several thousand preclearance requests are sent to the Attorney General").
76. See U.S. CONST. art. I, § 2.
77. See Samuel Issacharoff, Judging Politics: The Elusive Quest for Judicial Review
of Political Fairness, 71 TEx. L. REV. 1643, 1688-89 nn.227-32, 1690 & n.236 (1993)
(listing 1980s and 1990s cases involving reapportionment litigation).
78. As noted in Table 1, the Director of the Administrative Office breaks down the
data into "reapportionment" and "civil rights" hearings, with the latter including Voting
Rights Act Cases. See, e.g., 1993 DiR. OF THE ADMIN. OFF. OF THE U.S. COURTS ANN.
REP., tbl. S-9. However, given that most Voting Rights Act cases before three-judge
courts are, technically, pendent to reapportionment claims, see supra text accompanying
note 73 and infra notes 105-13 and accompanying text, it is not clear how "civil rights"
hearings can be sharply distinguished from apparently pure "reapportionment" hearings.
The Administrative Office could provide no further insight on this point, as it merely
reports data collected by the clerks of the various federal district courts. See Letter from
Steven R. Schlesinger, Chief, Statistics Division, Administrative Office of the United
States Courts, to Michael E. Solimine, Donald P. Klekamp Professor of Law, University
of Cincinnati College of Law (July 26, 1995) (on file with the University of Michigan
Journal of Law Reform). My own empirical study confirms the common sense assump-
tion that many, and perhaps most, three-judge district court cases at least ostensibly
involve both reapportionment and Voting Rights Act claims. See infra notes 247-48 and
accompanying text and tbl. 5. Of the 89 cases contained in that study, more than 70
formally presented both apportionment and Voting Rights Act claims.
79. See Reynolds v. Sims, 377 U.S. 533 (1964) (applying the one-person, one-vote
rule to state legislative apportionment); Wesberry v. Sanders, 376 U.S. 1 (1964) (holding
that congressional districts must be apportioned equally); Baker v. Carr, 369 U.S. 186
(1962) (holding that a challenge to state legislative reapportionment is cognizable under
the Equal Protection Clause).
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the application of the one-person, one-vote principle to disparate
factual circumstances."0 Cases involving the Voting Rights Act
are not so easy. As Pamela Karlan has noted, the "right to vote"
encompasses three analytically distinct though overlapping
interests-rights to participate in voting, to have votes aggregat-
ed fairly, and to be governed effectively."1 Litigation under the
Act to further these interests historically encountered several
problems. As others have noted, initial enforcement of the Act
focused on explicit barriers to voting. 2 The so-called "second
generation" of cases shifted to efforts to ensure that minorities
would be able to elect members of their groups to office.8 3 This
trend was stifled by the Supreme Court's 1980 decision in City
of Mobile v. Bolden,8 4 which required plaintiffs to prove discrimi-
natory intent in order to have an apportionment scheme or
electoral set-up thrown out on constitutional grounds. The trend
was revived in 1982 amendments to the Voting Rights Act. 5
Those amendments, as interpreted by the Supreme Court's
decision in Thornburg v. Gingles,"6 banned electoral practices
that had the effect of diluting the voting power of minority
80. See, e.g., Board of Estimate v. Morris, 489 U.S. 688 (1989) (applying one-person,
one-vote rule to city-wide elections in New York City); Halley v. Junior College Dist.,
397 U.S. 50 (1970) (applying one-person, one-vote rule to elections for trustees ofjunior
college district in Kansas City). But see Bush v. Vera, 116 S. Ct. 1941, 2001 (1996)
(Souter, J., dissenting) ("Within two years of holding in Baker v. Carr, 369 U.S. 186
(1962), that malapportionment was a justiciable issue, 'the Court recognized that its
general equal protection jurisprudence was insufficient for the task and announced an
increasingly rigid, simple to apply, voting-specific mandate of equipopulousity.'" (quoting
Pamela S. Karlan, Still Hazy After All These Years: Voting Rights in the Post-Shaw Era,
26 CUMB. L. REV. 287, 299 (1996))).
81. See Pamela S. Karlan, The Rights to Vote: Some Pessimism About Formalism,
71 TEx. L. REV. 1705, 1709-20 (1993).
82. See LANI GUINIER, THE TYRANNY OF THE MAJORITY: FUNDAMENTAL FAIRNESS
IN REPRESENTATIVE DEMOCRACY 7-9 (1994); Chandler Davidson, The Voting Rights Act:
A Brief History, in CONTROVERSIES IN MINORITY VOTING: THE VOTING RIGHTS ACT IN
PERSPECTIVE 7 (Bernard Grofman & Chandler Davidson eds., 1992); Richard H. Pildes,
The Politics of Race: Quiet Revolution in the South, 108 HARV. L. REV. 1359, 1362-65
(1995) (book review).
83. See Pildes, supra note 82, at 1363.
84. 446 U.S. 55 (1980).
85. Pub. L. No. 97-205, 96 Stat. 131 (1982) (codified at 42 U.S.C. § 1973(a)(1988)).
For further discussion of the amendments, see generally ABIGAIL THERNSTROM, WHOSE
VOTES COUNT? AFFIRMATIVE ACTION AND MINORITY VOTING RIGHTS (1987); Samuel
Issacharoff, Polarized Voting and the Political Process: The Transformation of Voting
Rights Jurisprudence, 90 MICH. L. REV. 1833 (1992); Laughlin McDonald, The 1982
Amendments in Section 2 and Minority Representation, in CONTROVERSIES IN MINORITY
VOTING: THE VOTING RIGHTS ACT IN PERSPECTIVE 66 (Bernard Grofman & Chandler
Davidson eds., 1992).
86. 478 U.S. 30 (1986).
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groups. The resulting creation in the 1990s of various legislative
districts to ensure the election of persons of color by "packing"
certain districts with minority group voters spawned litigation
contending that such districts violate the equal protection rights
of non-minority voters in those districts.87 Many cases of this
type have been, and will be, brought before three-judge district
courts.
This brief survey of voting rights litigation would not be
complete without some reference to the nature of such litigation.
Aside from developments in statutory and decisional law,
modern voting rights litigation not only appears to be increas-
ing88 but is characterized by a growing sophistication. Much of
the litigation at the trial level involves expert witnesses8 9 and
intricate computer models to construct proposed districts.90
These developments, coupled with an increasingly complex case
law, have recently moved two commentators to suggest that
Voting Rights Act litigation is often conducted "in terms
unfathomable to the named plaintiffs, defendants, and federal
judges."91 Not surprisingly, a specialized bar has arisen to
litigate these cases. 92 Whether the three-judge district court has
influenced or contributed to these developments is the subject
of the next two Parts.
87. See, e.g., Miller v. Johnson, 115 S. Ct. 2475 (1995); Shaw v. Reno, 509 U.S. 630
(1993).
88. See Issacharoff, supra note 77, at 1688-90 (noting the increase in challenges
to reapportionments from 1980 to 1990); see also Ronald E. Weber, Redistricting and
the Courts: Judicial Activism in the 1990s, 23 AM. POL. Q. 204,206-09 (1995) (advancing
various reasons for the apparent upsurge in litigation, including 1982 amendments to
the Voting Rights Act and more split control of state legislatures).
89. See Bernard Grofman, Expert Witness Testimony and the Evolution of Voting
Rights Case Law, in CONTROVERSIES IN MINORITY VOTING: THE VOTING RIGHTS ACT IN
PERSPECTIVE 197, 198 (Bernard Grofman & Chandler Davidson eds., 1992).
90. See Karlan, supra note 81, at 1726; see also Bush v. Vera, 116 S. Ct. 1941, 1976
n.5 (1996) (Stevens, J., dissenting) ("The dramatic increase in bizarrely shaped districts
after 1990 can be traced, at least in part, to the fact that computers allowed legislators
to achieve their political goals geographically in a manner far more precise than
heretofore possible.").
91. Paula D. McClain & Joseph Stewart Jr., W(h)ither the Voting Rights Act After
Shaw v. Reno: Advancing to the Past?, 8 POL. SCI. & POL. 24, 24 (1995); see also Uno
v. City of Holyoke, 72 F.3d 973, 977 (1st Cir. 1995) ("Three decades [after the passage
of the Voting Rights Act], the legislation remains a Serbonian bog in which plaintiffs
and defendants, pundits and policymakers, judges and justices find themselves
bemired.").
92. See Gregory A. Caldeira, Litigation, Lobbying, and the Voting Rights Bar, in
CONTROVERSIES IN MINORITY VOTING: THE VOTING RIGHTS ACT IN PERSPECTIVE 230 (Ber-
nard Grofman & Chandler Davidson eds., 1992) (discussing the development and success
of this bar).
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II. STRUCTURAL ASPECTS OF THE
THREE-JUDGE DISTRICT COURT
The modern three-judge district court results from the un-
planned confluence of two developments. One is the limitation
ofjurisdiction to reapportionment and related Voting Rights Act
cases. The other is the growth, both in quantity and importance,
of Voting Rights Act litigation since the early 1980s. These
developments have to some extent worked at cross-purposes, for
the first seemed to destine three-judge courts to relative desue-
tude, while the second highlighted their features for the few
cases they hear. This Part examines some of the features
inherent in litigation under § 2284,93 especially from the liti-
gants' perspective. The next Part examines the internal work-
ings of the three-judge court.
A. Statutory Interpretation
As described before, inordinately complex issues of inter-
pretation attended the statutes governing the court prior to
1976. The 1976 amendment was meant, in part, to resolve some
of those questions. That amendment, coupled with fewer cases
litigated before such courts,94 has led to fewer interpretational
difficulties. The amendment is not without its own complexi-
ties,95 but much less satellite litigation attempts to resolve
questions over the meaning of § 2284.96
93. 28 U.S.C. § 2284 (1994).
94. See supra notes 74-75 and accompanying text.
95. See Napoleon B. Williams, Jr., The New Three-Judge Courts ofReapportionment
and Continuing Problems of Three-Judge-Court Procedure, 65 GEO. L.J. 971, 974-75
(1977); see also DAVID P. CURRIE, FEDERAL COuRTS 570-72 (4th ed. 1990); WRIGHT ET
AL., supra note 20, at 603-26.
96. Before 1976, most of the blame could be attributed to the "prolix statute." See
Currie, supra note 20, at 13. But the Supreme Court was not entirely without fault. On
various occasions the Court self-consciously followed a non-literal approach to the
construction of §§ 2281 and 2282, avowedly to permit the district courts to operate
more efficiently. See, e.g., Hagans v. Lavine, 415 U.S. 528, 544-45 (1974) (arguing that
where the statutory issue is dispositive, it is unnecessary and inefficient for the district
court to defer to a three-judge panel); Swift & Co. v. Wickham, 382 U.S. 111, 124-27
(1965) (favoring a non-literal understanding of § 2281, which restricts three-judge
courts to substantive suits under the Constitution for reasons ofjudicial efficiency). But
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Still, a few questions that arose prior to the 1978 amendment
apparently remain unresolved. For example, prior law held that
the statutory trigger for convening a three-judge court was
jurisdictional; that is, it could not be waived and could be raised
at any time, even after proceedings on the merits before a single
district judge.97 After the amendment, most commentators
argued that the trigger was waivable,98 but a few modern courts,
pointing to the statutory language "shall be convened,"99 have
concluded that no waiver is possible. 100 Relatedly, in 1962 the
Supreme Court had held in Bailey v. Patterson101 that the three-
judge court need not be convened if the unconstitutionality of
the statute under attack was obvious. Commentators are unsure
whether Bailey survives the amendment, 10 2 and no recent
decision apparently has revisited the issue. The better view is
that Bailey does not survive the amendment, given the clarifica-
tion of the powers of the single district judge before whom the
action is originally filed. The statute severely limits the ability
of that judge to issue merits-related decisions before the full
court is convened. 103 Determining the "obviousness" of the
constitutional question presented by the case seems beyond the
purview of a single judge.
More relevant to the issues addressed by this Article, how-
ever, is whether three-judge district courts should hear Voting
Rights Act claims at all. Section 2284(a) simply states that
such courts shall be convened when the constitutionality of a
state's congressional or legislative apportionment is challenged,
or when an act of Congress otherwise provides for such courts.
The section contains no reference to the Voting Rights Act.
Several discrete provisions of the Act do require a three-judge
see Williams, supra note 95, at 975 n.13 (arguing that the Court did not consistently
interpret statutes in a non-literal fashion). Although non-literal interpretation does not
necessarily itself lead to doctrinal instability, it may well be a contributing factor.
97. See WRIGHT ET AL., supra note 20, § 4234.
98. See, e.g., WRIGHT ET AL., supra note 20, § 4235, at 609-10; Williams, supra note
95, at 975.
99. 28 U.S.C. § 2284(a) (1994).
100. See Armour v. Ohio, 925 F.2d 987, 989 (6th Cir. 1991) (en banc); Massachusetts
v. Mosbacher, 785 F. Supp. 230, 235 n.2 (D. Mass. 1992), rev'd on other grounds sub
nom. Franklin v. Massachusetts, 505 U.S. 788 (1992).
101. 369 U.S. 31 (1962) (per curiam).
102. Compare WRIGHT ET AL., supra note 20, § 4235, at 618 (arguing that Bailey is
good law), with CHARLES ALAN WRIGHT, LAW OF FEDERAL COuRTS 318 n.20 (5th ed.
1994) (claiming that Bailey has been overruled), and CURRIE, supra note 95, at 571
(questioning the viability of Bailey), and Williams, supra note 95, at 983-86 (arguing
that applicability of Bailey is limited but not precluded by the amendment of § 2284).
103. See 28 U.S.C. § 2284(b)(3).
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court for adjudication,' 4 but no omnibus provision in the Act
refers all or some litigation to such courts.
This lack of statutory directive has not been an obstacle
because three-judge courts, virtually without discussion,0 5
apparently have exercised a form of pendent jurisdiction to
adjudicate Voting Rights Act claims concurrently with the
constitutional (i.e., apportionment) claim. The result does not
seem problematic because the constitutional and statutory
claims will almost always relate closely factually, thus falling
comfortably within the parameters of traditional pendent
jurisdiction. Nonetheless, the Supreme Court's pre-amendment
ruling in Hagans v. Lavine"°6 does cast a cloud on this conclu-
sion. Hagans was not a three-judge court case,0 7 but in dicta
addressed the pendent jurisdiction issue.10 ' There, plaintiffs' civil
rights action advanced both federal constitutional and statutory
claims. Despite the apparent weakness of the former claim, the
Court held that it was nonetheless "substantial" enough at least
to confer subject matter jurisdiction on the district court.10 9
While that claim, all assumed, could only be heard by a three-
judge district court, the single judge before whom the case was
filed could decide the statutory claim, over which there was
pendent jurisdiction. Recall that the statute is textually limited
to constitutional attacks against state statutes."0 This result
would follow, even if the decision on the statutory claim would
moot the need to convene the three-judge court and decide the
constitutional issues by granting plaintiff the relief it desired.'
If Hagans remains good law with respect to three-judge
courts, the decision would seem to open the door to a single
district judge today deciding a Voting Rights Act claim joined
with a constitutional apportionment claim-both of which would
104. See supra notes 69-70 and accompanying text.
105. Commentators rarely have addressed the issue, either. But see Williams, supra
note 95, at 987-90. Such pendent jurisdiction would seem permitted under the supple-
mental jurisdiction statute, which by its terms is not limited to pendent state law claims.
See 28 U.S.C. § 1367(a) (1994).
106. 415 U.S. 528 (1974).
107. See id. at 543. We are told, cryptically, that plaintiffs "originally sought to
convene a three-judge court to consider their constitutional claims but later withdrew
that request. Pursuant to a stipulation between the parties, the case was then tried
before a single judge on the issue of the claimed statutory conflict only." Id. at 565 n.l1
(Rehnquist, J., dissenting).
108. See id. at 536.
109. See id. at 539.
110. 28 U.S.C. § 2284(a) (1994).
111. See Hagans, 415 U.S. at 543-45.
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normally be decided by a three-judge court.112 But no district
judge has ruled in this manner. The reason is probably that
pendent jurisdiction under Hagans is a discretionary power
only,113 and given the considerable factual overlap between
constitutional apportionment and Voting Rights Act claims, it
would not be in the interest of judicial economy to try those
claims before separate courts. Moreover, there is no guarantee
that relief under the latter will moot all relief claimed under the
former. It would seem, though, that a single judge could decide
a pendent Voting Rights Act claim that dealt with a geographi-
cally discrete issue, not one of state-wide concern. Only the
latter claims were deemed important enough to survive the 1976
amendment, a subject to which we now turn.
B. Coverage of§ 2284
As amended, § 2284(a) is limited to constitutional attacks on
apportionment for congressional seats or state-wide legislative
offices and, indirectly, related Voting Rights Act claims. The
Senate Judiciary Committee report labeled these claims impor-
tant enough to receive adjudication by three-judge courts.
11 4
Admittedly, the Senate employed a hopelessly subjective term,
but the judgment seems to have been correct. In a democracy,
the right to vote is in some sense a predicate for the enjoyment
and enforcement of all other rights."5 As such, how a state
carves up its congressional districts is a matter of high concern
both to it and to the national government. 16 How it determines
its own government structure is obviously of equal if not greater
112. See supra notes 104-08 and accompanying text. Compare Williams, supra note
95, at 989 (arguing that Hagans is good law), with CURRIE, supra note 95, at 571 n.2
(asking if Hagans remains good law in light of the amendment to § 2284).
113. See Hagans, 415 U.S. at 544-45, 549-50.
114. See S. REP. No. 94-204, at 9 (1975), reprinted in 1976 U.S.S.C.A.N. 1988, 1991;
supra text accompanying note 63.
115. See also LOWENSTEIN, supra note 13, at 21 ("If the election mechanism is at the
heart of any democracy, then the right to vote in elections is a central democratic right
and the act of voting is the most elemental form of democratic participation."); cf.
Reynolds v. Sims, 377 U.S. 533, 562 (1964) (arguing that the right to vote is "preserva-
tive of other basic civil and political rights"); Yick Wo v. Hopkins, 118 U.S. 356, 370
(1886) (describing voting as "a fundamental political right, because preservative of all
rights").
116. Cf U.S. Term Limits, Inc. v. Thornton, 115 S. Ct. 1842 (1995) (expressing a
national interest in having each state maintain uniform qualification requirements for
congressional representatives).
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concern to the state. Recent litigation under the Voting Rights
Act has only accentuated these concerns. The Act, both in its pre-
clearance requirements 17 and its sanctioning of private enforce-
ment,'18 in effect requires that many states and their political
subdivisions obtain the permission of a federal decisionmaker
(the DOJ or a federal judge) before making changes to electoral
structures." 9 The federalism concerns are coupled with the
results of recent cases, such that, as Professor Richard Pildes
has remarked, the "Act currently represents the most visible
symbol of the struggle over race-conscious public policies." 20
Empirical evidence has buttressed these theoretical concerns.
Reapportionment led to shifts of power from state legislators
representing rural constituencies to legislators representing
urban and suburban voters.12 ' This shift, in turn, has led to
changes in legislative policymaking benefiting the latter
groups.122 Similarly, administrative and judicial enforcement of
the Voting Rights Act has been credited with eradicating poli-
cies (particularly in the South) intended to disenfranchise
African-Americans, and with increasing dramatically the num-
ber of voters and elected officials among African-Americans.
123
All of these circumstances suggest that § 2284(a) does indeed
cover important cases.
But important for what purposes? Recall that the original
purposes of the three-judge court, as a reaction to Ex parte
Young, were to encourage greater deliberation by judges, to lend
117. See 42 U.S.C. § 1973a(c) (1994).
118. See id. § 1973gg-9(b).
119. See James F. Blumstein, Federalism and Civil Rights: Complementary and
Competing Paradigms, 47 VAND. L. REV. 1251, 1262-64 (1994) (discussing Voting Rights
Act preclearance requirements); Larry Kramer, Understanding Federalism, 47 VAND.
L. REV. 1485, 1506-07 (1994) (discussing federal control over state election structures).
120. Pildes, supra note 82, at 1361 (footnote omitted); see also Pamela S. Karlan,
Democracy and Dis-Appointment, 93 MICH. L. REV. 1273, 1295 (1995) (reviewing LANI
GUINIER, THE TYRANNY OF THE MAJORITY: FUNDAMENTAL FAIRNESS IN REPRESENTATIVE
DEMOCRACY (1994)) ("The Voting Rights Act is a complex, technical, regulatory statute.
But the Act trenches directly on questions of basic political theory and reality, and it
does so in the context of the most divisive issue in America today-race.").
121. See David C. Safell, Reapportionment and Public Policy: State Legislators
Perspectives, in REPRESENTATION AND REDISTRICTING ISSUES 210 (Bernard Grofman et
al. eds., 1982).
122. See id. There is debate among the studies as to the significance to be attribut-
ed to changing malapportioned districts because policy outcomes are the result of many
different forces and not only the voting power of various constituencies. See RICHARD
A. POSNER, OVERCOMING LAW 205 (1995) (surveying this debate).
123. See Jean-Pierre Benoit & Lewis A. Kornhauser, Assembly-Based Preferences,
Candidate-Based Procedures, and the Voting Rights Act, 68 S. CAL. L. REV. 1503,
1503-05 (1995); Pildes, supra note 82, at 1360-61.
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greater dignity and more acceptance to decisions, and to provide
expedited Supreme Court review.124 Because these are largely
subjective criteria, it is difficult to determine definitively wheth-
er cases litigated today under § 2284 have led to these results.
The workings of a multi-member trial court 125 and the operation
of direct Supreme Court review are considered below. 126 Perhaps
the existence of the third factor-greater dignity and accep-
tance-could be determined objectively by surveying affected
publics in a particular state. Acceptance might be examined by
measuring the rate of appeal. There is, presumably, some neg-
ative correlation between those two considerations. The decision
to appeal any trial court decision usually will depend on the
losing litigants' perception of the probability of winning the
appeal, the availability of resources to pursue the appeal, and
the willingness to live with a trial court decision with which the
litigants disagree.' 27 The fact that a three-judge district court
rendered the trial decision may suggest that reversal is unlikely,
or the losing party may be mollified by the presence of three
adjudicators, at least two of whom held against the party.
Hence, that party may be less likely to appeal. The evidence
mildly undermines this hypothesis. Historically, about one-third
of all three-judge district court decisions have been appealed to
the Supreme Court, 28 and more recent data suggest an appeal
rate of closer to forty percent. 129 In contrast, in recent times the
appeal rate of district court decisions to the appellate courts has
only been about twenty percent.130 Still, one should not read too
much into this disparity. The typical federal trial court case is
quite different from a typical § 2284 case, and perhaps the latter
124. See supra text accompanying note 30.
125. See infra Part III.B.
126. See infra Part II.D.
127. See Gregory J. Rathjen, Lawyers and the Appellate Choice: An Analysis of
Factors Affecting the Decision to Appeal, 6 AM. POL. Q. 387, 397, 398 (1978); Donald R.
Songer et al., An Empirical Test of the Rational-Actor Theory of Litigation, 57 J. POL.
1119, 1121, 1127-28 (1995).
128. See ROBERT L. STERN ET AL., SUPREME COURT PRACTICE 56 n.35 (7th ed. 1993)
(noting that in 1971, 318 three-judge courts were convened, and 120 appeals were filed;
in 1981, the numbers were 35 and 13 respectively).
129. See infra note 204. From my database of 89 cases decided between 1976 and
1994, there were 46 appeals, a 51% appeal rate. See also infra app.
130. See CAROL KRAFKA ET AL., STALKING THE INCREASE IN THE RATE OF FEDERAL
CIVIL APPEALS 8-9 (Federal Judicial Ctr. ed., 1995); JUDITH A. MCKENNA, STRUCTURAL
AND OTHER ALTERNATIVES FOR THE FEDERAL COURTS OF APPEALS 24-31 (Federal
Judicial Ctr. ed., 1993); Steven Shavell, The Appeals Process as a Means of Error
Correction, 24 J. LEGAL STUD. 379, 380 n.3 (1995).
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are (if only grudgingly) more accepted by the losing party once
there is review by the Supreme Court.
Another problem with the ambit of the current version of
§ 2284 may be the statute's potential underinclusiveness.' 3 '
Undoubtedly, in 1910 some thought that federal court attacks
on all state statutes merited the special three-judge hearing.
Presumably, the drafters of the 1976 amendment thought voting
rights cases were paramount, as they left three-judge district
courts intact for such cases. As the ALI recognized, not including
state-wide voting rights cases within the three-judge district
court jurisdiction may be a reasonable accommodation of the
competing policy concerns.' 32 Even so, some voting rights cases
may have de facto state-wide implications, and thus not fall
under § 2284. Consider recent litigation concerning the Voting
Rights Act and elective state judiciaries. In this decade alone,
such cases have been litigated in Louisiana, Florida, Alabama,
Texas, and Ohio, all challenging the election of judges.1 33 All
were litigated before a single district judge, even though all
seem to have state-wide significance.33 A recent challenge to a
131. The statute could be viewed as overinclusive as well if we consider the esoteric
(albeit little-litigated) instances where a three-judge court can be convened at the
direction of specific statutes. See supra note 69.
132. See supra text accompanying notes 41-48.
133. See Chisom v. Roemer, 501 U.S. 380, 384 (1991) (challenging the at-large
election of two members of the Louisiana Supreme Court); White v. Alabama, 74 F.3d
1058, 1060 (11th Cir. 1996) (challenging state-wide election of the members of Ala-
bama's appellate courts); SCLC v. Sessions, 56 F.3d 1281, 1284 (11th Cir. 1995) (en
banc) (challenging Alabama trial courts in districts that encompassed "a majority of the
state's population"), cert. denied, 116 S. Ct. 704 (1996); Nipper v. Smith, 39 F.3d 1494,
1499 (11th Cir. 1994) (en banc) (challenging election of trial judges in and around
Jacksonville, Florida), cert. denied, 115 S. Ct. 1795 (1995); League of United Latin Am.
Citizens Council No. 4434 v. Clements, 914 F.2d 620, 634 (5th Cir. 1990) (en banc)
(Higginbotham, J., concurring) (challenging the at-large election ofjudges in only nine
of Texas' 254 counties, where those counties elected 172 of 390 district judges), rev'd
sub nom. Houston Lawyers' Ass'n v. Attorney Gen., 501 U.S. 419 (1991); Mallory v.
Ohio, Case No. 94CV2205 (N.D. Ohio 1994) (challenging election of trial and appellate
judges in eight of Ohio's most populous counties) (case transferred to S.D. Ohio, now
litigated as Mallory v. Ohio, Case No. C-2-95-381 (S.D. Ohio)).
134. A Voting Rights Act challenge to all of the elected judges in Georgia was
brought before a three-judge district court. See Brooks v. State Bd. of Elections, 775 F.
Supp. 1470, 1474 (S.D. Ga. 1989), af'd mem., 498 U.S. 916 (1990), modified, 775 F. Supp.
1490 (S.D. Ga. 1991), settlement agreement rejected, 848 F. Supp. 1548 (S.D. Ga. 1994),
appeal dismissed, 59 F.3d 1114 (11th Cir. 1995). It would be difficult to bring such a
constitutional challenge directly under § 2284(a), because the statute only refers to
legislative apportionment and thus seems to exclude challenges to court elections. See
Williams, supra note 95, at 980. Brooks was a private action under the preclearance
provision, section 5 of the Voting Rights Act, and thus required a court of three district
court judges. See 42 U.S.C. § 1973c (1994); see also Allen v. State Bd. of Elections, 393
U.S. 544 (1969) (applying section 5 to private actions). The Brooks litigation also
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governor's practice of filling judicial vacancies on a purely
partisan basis ran a similar course.'35
Nonetheless, it is difficult to propose a statutory change that
might include these cases, or other voting rights cases of state-
wide significance, without defeating the point of the 1976
amendment, or without generating satellite litigation. The ALI
may well have made the right decision when it drew a bright
line at cases formally attacking apportionment of all state
districting. 136
C. Forum Shopping
The strategy of forum shopping plays some role in virtually
all civil litigation in the United States.'37 Pamela Karlan
suggests that three-judge district court litigation is no stranger
to such tactics. She argues that after the decennial census,
involved constitutional claims and claims under section 2 of the Voting Rights Act, which
can only be decided by the convening judge of the three-judge court. An appeal from
those claims lies in the appellate court. See Letter from David F. Walbert, Counsel for
Defendants in Brooks, to Michael E. Solimine, Donald P. Klekamp Professor of Law,
University of Cincinnati College of Law (Sept. 7, 1995) (on file with the University of
Michigan Journal of Law Reform). See generally Anna M. Scuggs et al., Recent Voting
Rights Act Challenges to Judicial Elections, 79 JUDICATURE 34, 34-41 (1995) (sum-
marizing challenges to state judicial elections since 1991); Kirsten Lundgaard Izatt,
Note, The Voting Rights Act and Judicial Elections: Accommodating the Interests of
States Without Compromising the Goals of the Act, 1996 U. ILL. L. REV. 229, 234-39
(discussing the differences between challenges to legislative and judicial elections).
135. See Newman v. Voinovich, 789 F. Supp. 1410 (S.D. Ohio 1992) (dismissing case),
affd, 986 F.2d 159 (6th Cir.), cert. denied, 509 U.S. 924 (1993). The author was co-
counsel for the Plaintiff in Newman. The principal claim in Newman was that the
governor's practice violated the First Amendment rights of persons, of the wrong party,
who were interested in being considered for the vacancy. The Voting Rights Act claim
was that the practice had the effect of appointing fewer members of minority groups
which, given the immense advantage of incumbents (at least in Ohio, see Lawrence
Baum, The Electoral Fates of Incumbent Judges in the Ohio Court of Common Pleas, 66
JUDICATURE 420, 424-25 (1983)), had the further effect of diluting the votes of persons
who desired to vote for a minority judge. The court rejected the constitutional argument
on the merits. See Newman, 789 F. Supp. at 1420. The trial court found that the plaintiff
lacked standing to pursue the voting rights claim. See id. at 1415-16. The ruling was
not challenged on appeal. See id. at 160 n. 1.
Courts generally have held that the Voting Rights Act does not apply to appointive
offices, at least where there has not been a change from an elective system to an
appointive one. See Matthew M. Hoffman, The Illegitimate President: Minority Vote
Dilution and the Electoral College, 105 YALE L.J. 935, 974 & n.182 (1996).
136. For a more general discussion of reforms of § 2284, see infra Part IV.
137. See Note, Forum Shopping Reconsidered, 103 HARV. L. REV. 1677 (1990)
(discussing the pervasive importance of forum shopping); see also Victor E. Flango,
Litigant Choice Between State and Federal Courts, 46 S.C. L. REV. 961 (1995) (discussing
the continued importance of and controversy over forum shopping).
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plaintiffs and potential defendants have raced to federal and
state courthouses in attempts to secure favorable forums, and
that recently such litigation has been characterized by simul-
taneous federal and state filings. She further asserts that the
litigant's forum shopping can be exacerbated when a result-
oriented circuit chief judge "stacks" the panel. 3 ' She predicts
that the result in Shaw v. Reno"9 could permit plaintiffs who
live outside the challenged district to bring suit, further
increasing the opportunities for lawyers seeking to obtain
favorable venues or judges. 4 °
Karlan is descriptively accurate, but she may slightly over-
state the point. She is concerned rightly about the potential for
panel stacking, and this Article addresses that phenomenon
below.' Her prediction about the effect of Shaw has not come
to pass. In the 1994 Term, the Supreme Court held in United
States v. Hays'42 that plaintiffs bringing Shaw-type claims must
vote in the district under challenge. 143 Those who live outside
the district cannot show an injury and, hence, lack standing to
bring the claim. Nonetheless, Hays does not seem a particular
obstacle to an ambitious attorney and, given the number of
voters, it should not be difficult to sign up a plaintiff inside the
district. 4 4 Moreover, voting rights cases do not indicate that
standing offers much of a barrier.
A surprising amount of parallel litigation has occurred in both
state and federal courts. The Supreme Court addressed this
sharing of responsibilities in Growe v. Emison,'45 which held
that three-judge courts must defer to apportionment disputes
already being litigated in state court. 46 In Growe, a group of
plaintiffs affiliated with Minnesota's Democratic-Farmer Labor
Party had sued in state court, while their Republican political
138. See Karlan, supra note 81, at 1726-29.
139. 509 U.S. 630 (1993).
140. See Karlan, supra note 81, at 1727 n.95.
141. See infra Part III.A.
142. 115 S. Ct. 2431 (1995).
143. See id. at 2436. The Court added that a plaintiff living outside the challenged
district might have standing if she were able to present specific evidence that she had,
nonetheless, been subject to a racial classification forbidden by Shaw. See id.
144. See Samuel Issacharoff, The Constitutional Contours of Race and Politics, 1995
SUP. CT. REV. 45, 62. In Hays itself, new plaintiffs (who apparently satisfied standing
requirements) were added to the suit, and the case continued to be litigated in 1996.
See id. at 62-63.
145. 507 U.S. 25 (1993). An excellent review of the political background of the Growe
litigation is found in Karlan, supra note 75, at 257-63.
146. See Growe, 507 U.S. at 34.
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opponents brought suit in federal court.14 A similar pattern is
found in Voinovich v. Quilter.14 8 There, after the 1990 census,
a Republican-controlled Ohio House of Representatives increased
the number of majority-African-American districts. Some Demo-
crats charged that this increase was an effort to pack minority
voters in certain districts where minorities already had been
able to elect African-American representatives, thereby reducing
their voting power in the other districts. Republicans filed an
original declaratory judgment motion in the Ohio Supreme
Court (with a four to three Republican majority at the time) to
have the districting plan declared valid under state law. That
declaration followed, but Democrats filed suit in federal court,
and the Supreme Court eventually rejected a Voting Rights Act
attack on the plan.149
The Voinovich litigation continues. A three-judge court found
on remand that the plaintiffs' remaining constitutional one-
person, one-vote claim had not been proven. 5° Following this it
granted, over a dissent, plaintiffs' motion to file an amended
complaint that advanced a new constitutional claim, one that
might be called a reverse-Shaw claim. 5' Plaintiffs now argued
that Shaw, rendered shortly after the Supreme Court decided
Voinovich, forbade the packing of African-American voters in
certain districts for the express purpose of diluting their voting
strength in districts where they had been an influential minori-
ty."'52 Hearings were held on that issue, and in the spring of 1995
a majority of the court found several of the districts to have been
designed in a constitutionally improper manner.'53 In dissent,
147. See id. at 28-29; Karlan, supra note 75, at 257.
148. 507 US. 146 (1993).
149. See id. For an excellent review of the complicated Voinovich litigation, see
Karlan, supra note 75, at 264-67; Karlan, supra note 81, at 1734-36. The author would
also like to thank Mark D. Tucker, one of the attorneys representing the defendants in
Voinovich, for his information and insights on that litigation.
150. See Quilter v. Voinovich, 857 F. Supp. 579, 587 (N.D. Ohio 1994).
151. See Quilter v. Voinovich, 157 F.R.D. 36, 40 (N.D. Ohio 1994); cf. Karlan, supra
note 75, at 268-70 (recognizing the possibility of this argument, post-Shaw).
152. See Quilter, 157 F.R.D. at 38.
153. See Quilter v. Voinovich, Case No. 91CV2219 (N.D. Ohio Apr. 28, 1995). Since
the spring of 1995 the Voinovich litigation has followed a convoluted path. As noted, the
original opinion was filed on April 28. On May 26, the majority issued a new opinion,
which (among other things) responded more directly to some of the arguments made by
Judge Dowd in his dissent on the earlier date. Still later, on August 11, the majority
issued another revised opinion. See 912 F. Supp. 1006 (N.D. Ohio 1995) (incorporating
the then recently decided Miller v. Johnson, 115 S. Ct. 2475 (1995)). In the meantime,
the defendants filed a jurisdictional statement in the Supreme Court on July 24 (Case
No. 95-132), appealing the decisions of April 28 and May 26. The Supreme Court
dismissed the appeal of the April 28 decision. See 116 S. Ct. 42 (1995). At the end of the
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District Judge David Dowd ruefully observed that had a new
lawsuit been filed to advance this Shaw-type claim (if the
motion to amend the complaint has been denied, as he had
urged), then, presumably, a new three-judge district court would
have convened. The lawyers, in his judgment, had been given
the opportunity "to select the judge[s] they wish to have adjudi-
cate their lawsuit."'54 What Judge Dowd did not add were the
specific reasons the mostly Democratic plaintiffs favored the
original draw. Judge Dowd is an appointee of a Republican
administration, while the other two members, Senior Circuit
Judge Anthony Celebrezze and Circuit Judge Nathaniel Jones,
are appointees of Democratic presidents."' 5 Although partisan-
ship as an explanation of voting behavior on three-judge courts
is overblown,156 there seems little doubt that the attorneys on
both sides of Voinovich and in other cases 57 attempted to seek
multi-judge forums with a number of seemingly favorable judges
of a particular political party.
D. Direct Supreme Court Review
Section 1253 of the Judicial Code states, with little elabora-
tion, that a party may appeal an order from a three-judge
1995 Term, the Court vacated the August 11 decision and remanded for further
consideration in light of Bush v. Vera and Shaw v. Hunt. See Voinovich v. Quilter, 116
S. Ct. 2542 (1996).
154. Quilter, 912 F. Supp. at 1036 n.2 (Dowd, J., dissenting), vacated, 116 S. Ct. 2542
(1996).
155. See 950 F.2d xviii-xix (1991) (listing the appointment dates for these judges).
For those concerned with partisanship, it is further worth noting that the Chief Judge
of the Sixth Circuit, Gilbert Merritt, who appointed Judges Celebrezze and Jones to the
panel, was a Democratic appointee. For further discussion of the role of chiefjudges in
constituting panels, see infra Part III.A. Judge Celebrezze resigned from the Sixth
Circuit on the next business day after the first Voinovich decision, although he continued
to vote on the panel as it considered various motions in 1995. By order of June 23, 1995,
Judge Merritt extended Judge Celebrezze's designation on the case "until a final
judgment has been entered." The order was entered nunc pro tunc effective May 1, 1995.
See Jurisdictional Statement, Voinovich v. Quilter, Case No. 95-132, app. G (filed July
24, 1995), appeal dismissed, 116 S. Ct. 42 (1995). See generally James F. Spriggs II &
Paul J. Wahlbeck, Calling It Quits: Strategic Retirement on the Federal Courts of
Appeals, 1893-1991, 48 POL. REs. Q. 573 (1995). Circuit Judge Karen Nelson Moore, a
Clinton appointee, was assigned to replace Judge Celebrezze on Voinovich after remand.
156. See infra Part III.C.
157. For further illustrations ofsuchjockeying for forum advantage in modern voting
rights cases, see Karlan, supra note 81, at 1727-28 (discussing cases from Illinois,
Pennsylvania, California, and New York).
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district court granting or denying an injunction.15' It has under-
gone no change since the 1948 general recodification of the
Judicial Code, and unlike § 2284 of the Code, Congress did not
amend it in 1976."29 It remains a controversial piece of the three-
judge court institution. Thirty years ago, Professor Currie
deemed the burdens imposed by direct review upon the Supreme
Court as more serious than those imposed upon the lower
courts.16 ° Another commentator has argued that direct review
"forc[es] the hand of the Supreme Court without benefit of prior
appellate review." 6 ' And with regard to voting rights cases,
Pamela Karlan has observed that three-judge court decisions
practically are unreviewable, given that the Supreme Court only
rarely will conduct a full review of any given decision.
1 61
As with other criticisms of the three-judge district court
litigation, these arguments are largely subjective. At first blush,
it may be difficult to argue that such courts have contributed to
lower quality decisionmaking by the Supreme Court. Indeed,
perhaps the most famous Supreme Court decisions of this
century, Brown v. Board of Education'63 and Roe v. Wade,'64
involved, at least in part, reviews of three-judge courts. In
addition, three-judge courts have played a role in many impor-
tant cases involving voting rights decided by the Supreme
Court.'65 It is hard to say that these decisions would have been
158. 28 U.S.C. § 1253 (1994).
159. Section 1253 has been left intact despite commentators' arguments that it be
amended or deleted. See Currie, supra note 20, at 76-79; Williams, supra note 95, at
994.
160. See Currie, supra note 20, at 73-74.
161. HOWARD, supra note 3, at 283 (summarizing the views of a number of circuit
judges).
162. See Karlan, supra note 81, at 1729. Karlan added that a number of important
voting rights cases have not received the full appellate review that they deserved. See
id. at 1729 & n.108.
163. 347 U.S. 483 (1954), rev'g Briggs v. Elliot, 98 F. Supp. 529 (E.D.S.C. 1951),
Briggs v. Elliot, 103 F. Supp. 920 (E.D.S.C. 1952), and Davis v. County Sch. Bd., 103
F. Supp. 337 (E.D. Va. 1952).
164. 410 U.S. 113 (1973), affg 314 F. Supp. 1217 (N.D. Tex. 1970) (per curiam).
165. See, e.g., Reynolds v. Sims, 377 U.S. 533, 568 (1964) (establishing the one-
person, one-vote principle), affg 208 F. Supp. 431 (M.D. Ala. 1962) (per curiam);
Wesberry v. Sanders, 376 U.S. 1, 7-8 (1964) (requiring that congressional districts be
apportioned equally), rev'g 206 F. Supp. 276 (N.D. Ga. 1962); Baker v. Carr, 369 U.S.
186, 198-99 (1962) (holding that a reapportionment challenge presented a justiciable
controversy), rev'g 179 F. Supp. 824 (M.D. Tenn. 1959) (per curiam).
The three-judge court has also delivered influential decisions in other areas. See, e.g.,
San Antonio Indep. Sch. Dist. v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 1, 53-54 (1973) (upholding property
tax funding for schools), rev'g 337 F. Supp. 280 (W.D. Tex. 1971) (per curiam); Mitchum
v. Foster, 407 U.S. 225, 242-43 (1972) (holding that 42 U.S.C. § 1983 is an exception
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"better," or more acceptable, had the cases reached the Supreme
Court by the normal appellate process.
Indeed, statistics available from the United States Supreme
Court Judicial Data Base Project 66 demonstrate that the Court
did not treat appeals from three-judge district courts differently
than appeals lodged from the federal courts of appeals or state
supreme courts. For example, from the 1953 through the 1993
Terms, the petitioner in appeals from three-judge district court
decisions prevailed, in whole or in part, about sixty-three
percent of the time, while the comparable figure for appeals
from other courts is sixty-two percent. 167 But the composition of
the two sets is not wholly similar. Appeals from three-judge
courts were much more likely to raise civil rights or First
Amendment issues as compared to the other appeals.66 Thus,
it is fair to say that a disproportionate number of the civil rights
cases that dominated the docket of the Warren Court and the
early Burger Court were the products of three-judge district
courts.
Still, the systemic affect of appeals from three-judge courts
upon the Supreme Court has been deleterious. As previously
to the Anti-Injunction Act), rev'g 315 F. Supp. 1387 (N.D. Fla. 1970) (per curiam); Lemon
v. Kurtzman, 403 U.S. 602, 614-15 (1971) (establishing a three-part test to evaluate
Establishment Clause Claims), rev'g 310 F. Supp. 35 (E.D. Pa. 1969); Younger v. Harris,
401 U.S. 37, 53 (1971) (holding that federal court injunctions of state court proceedings
are subject to equitable restraints), rev'g 281 F. Supp. 507 (C.D. Cal. 1968); Wickard v.
Filburn, 317 U.S. 111, 125 (1942) (holding that Commerce Clause power can extend to
intrastate activities that affect interstate commerce), rev'g 43 F. Supp. 1017 (S.D. Ohio
1942).
166. The U.S. Supreme Court Judicial Data Base Project (the project) contains
information obtained from coding numerous variables for each of the Supreme Court's
decisions in the terms from 1953 to 1993. The project itself results from the efforts of
Professor Harold J. Spaeth of Michigan State University Department of Political Science.
See Jeffrey A. Segal & Harold J. Spaeth, Decisional Trends on the Warren and Burger
Courts: Results from the Supreme Court Data Base Project, 73 JUDICATURE 103, 103
(1989); Harold J. Spaeth, A Summary Description of the Contents of the U.S. Supreme
Court Judicial Data Base, 8 L., CTs. & JUD. PROCESS SEC. NEWSL. 3, 3-6 (Am. Political
Science Ass'n, Spring 1991) (on file with the University of Michigan Journal of Law Re-
form).
I am deeply indebted to Professor James L. Walker for accessing the data base for
me. See Memorandum from James L. Walker, Professor of Political Science, Wright State
University, to Michael E. Solimine, Donald P. Klekamp Professor of Law, University
of Cincinnati College of Law (Jan. 17, 1996) (on file with the University of Michigan
Journal of Law Reform) [hereinafter Walker Memorandum].
167. See Walker Memorandum, supra note 166, at 1 (noting that the data were
limited to fully argued cases, i.e., those not summarily affirmed or reversed).
168. See id. at 6. Civil rights and First Amendment cases made up 35.16% and
12.87%, respectively, of the three-judge district court cases reviewed by the Supreme
Court from 1964 to 1993. The comparable figures for all other appeals were 14.12% and
8.26%, respectively. See id.
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observed,169 in the 1960s and early 1970s, hundreds of such
appeals were lodged annually in the Court. As Table 2 dem-
onstrates, in some Terms in the 1970s up to a quarter of the
fully argued cases consisted of such appeals. Given the language
of § 1253, the Court could have heard every such appeal on a
fully argued basis. 170 It is understandable that it did not. While
hard to measure, there may well be much truth to the notion
that an intermediate layer of appellate review will sharpen the
issues of law, streamline the factual record, and weed out cases
with inadequate records or those that are otherwise inappropri-
ate vehicles for ultimate review. 17' Had the Court truly attempt-
ed to review fully every appeal from a three-judge district court
it would have crowded out many or most of the discretionary
appeals from the federal courts of appeals and the state supreme
courts.
Thus, it is no surprise that the Court has long applied § 1253
in a way that resembles the discretionary writ of certiorari.1
72
In its current Rule 18,173 the Court requires that appellants file
jurisdictional statements almost identical to petitions for writ
of certiorari.' 4 Then the Court "may dispose summarily of the
appeal on the merits" or note probable jurisdiction and set the
case for briefing and oral arguments on the merits.'7 5 Thus, even
though the Court apparently must hear every appeal under
§ 1253 if the statute is read literally, under Rule 18 the Court
only needs to hear fully those appeals it wishes.'
6
169. See supra notes 43, 58 and accompanying text.
170. Section 1253 states, in part, that "any party may appeal to the Supreme Court"
decisions rendered by three-judge district courts. 28 U.S.C. § 1253 (1994).
171. See Shavell, supra note 130, at 417-18.
172. See STERN ET AL., supra note 128, at 56-71; WRIGHT ET AL., supra note 20,
§ 4040.
173. See Sup. CT. R. 18. No substantive changes to this rule were made when the
Supreme Court revised it in 1995. See 161 F.R.D. 483, 497-98 (1995).
174. See Sup. CT. R. 18.3.
175. SUP. CT. R. 18.11.
176. See H.W. PERRY, JR., DECIDING TO DECIDE: AGENDA SETTING IN THE UNITED
STATES SUPREME COURT 29-32, 104-06 (1991).
Evidence suggests that direct appeals are not treated identically to writs of certiorari.
For example, one statistical study found that grants of a writ were highly correlated
with the filing of amicus curiae briefs in support of or opposed to the granting of the
writ. See Gregory A. Caldeira & John R. Wright, Organized Interests and Agenda Setting
in the U.S. Supreme Court, 82 AM. POL. Sci. REv. 1109, 1118 (1988). Perry's study, based
largely on interviews of the Justices and their clerks, finds this correlation as well. See
PERRY, supra, at 137. The Caldeira-Wright study, however, found no such correlation
for the noting of probable jurisdiction on appeals, and concluded that "the Court indeed
makes its decisions on appeals in a manner significantly different from those on
certiorari." Caldeira & Wright, supra, at 1124-25 n.12. Caldeira subsequently suggested
that while "many of the same considerations go into the decision" to review fully an
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This practice seems to be a sound one. Even in an era of a
diminished number of three-judge court cases, 177 if every such
appeal were heard fully, then for one or two Terms each decade
after the wave of litigation generated by the census the Court
would do little more than hear voting rights cases. There seems
no particular reason why every such case from each state must
be heard.
178
Still, the current manner of disposing of putatively mandatory
appeals is not without its costs, which are similar to those
attending the certiorari process. Presumably, the Court will
devote full treatment to those appeals not grounded in highly
specific or peculiar facts and will thereby present opportunities
for law development. But the Court might decide incorrectly,
giving important cases mere summary treatment. 179 Similarly,
the Court might give full treatment to a case that did not
deserve it, at least not at that time. The direct appeal from
district courts minimizes opportunities for the percolation of
legal issues among the lower courts, which can inform the
Court's eventual disposition of an issue.18° Doctrinally, the Court
appeal as to grant a writ of certiorari, "the differences [might] stem from the greater
ease writs of appeal have in making it on to the plenary docket." Letter from Gregory
A. Caldeira, Professor of Political Science, Ohio State University, to Michael E. Solimine,
Donald P. Klekamp Professor of Law, University of Cincinnati College of Law 1 (Sept.
5, 1995) (on file with the University of Michigan Journal of Law Reform). Perhaps a
related reason is that amicus participation is unnecessary to signal the importance of
appeals from three-judge district courts because the Justices (and their clerks) are aware
that such appeals are apt to be politically charged.
177. See supra notes 74-75 and accompanying text.
178. Cf William N. Eskridge, Jr. & Philip P. Frickey, The Supreme Court, 1993
Term-Foreword: Law as Equilibrium, 108 HARV. L. REV. 26 (1994) (developing a model
of the Court consciously interacting with other branches of government).
Several authors have studied the question ofwhether and to what extent the Justices
consciously manage their agenda through the certiorari process. See, e.g., RICHARD L.
PACELLE, JR., THE TRANSFORMATION OF THE SUPREME CoURTs AGENDA: FROM THE NEW
DEAL TO THE REAGAN ADMINISTRATION (1991); Leslie Friedman Goldstein & Diana Stich,
Explaining Transformations in Supreme Court Policy, 79 JUDICATURE 80 (1995); David
G. Savage, Docket Reflects Ideological Shifts, 81 A.B.A. J. 40 (1995). Empirical evidence
demonstrates that cases on direct appeal hinder the Court's ability to decide only one
or several of a series of discrete issues that might be raised by a case subject to review.
See Kevin T. McGuire & Barbara Palmer, Issue Fluidity on the U.S. Supreme Court, 89
AM. POL. Sci. REV. 691, 693-94, 696-97 (1995) (studying the 1988 Term).
179. See Karlan, supra note 81, at 1727 n.95.
180. For discussions of the percolation theory, see SAMUEL ESTREICHER & JOHN
SEXTON, REDEFINING THE SUPREME COURT'S ROLE: A THEORY OF MANAGING THE
FEDERAL JUDICIAL PROCESS 48-70 (1986); PERRY, supra note 176, at 220-21, 230-34;
Martha J. Dragich, Once a Century: Time for a Structural Overhaul of the Federal
Courts, 1996 WiS. L. REV. 11, 35-36 n.140.
An example of the problem might be Roe v. Wade, which was an appeal from a three-
judge court. See 410 U.S. 113 (1973). It has been argued, though by no means
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has generated great confusion about the precedential weight it
should give to summary dispositions. The Court typically states
that such dispositions are entitled to some weight, but not the
full weight of a fully argued case."' Such amorphous standards
are ripe for confusion.1
82
Finally, the effect of the direct appeal on lower court
decisionmaking should be considered. Does the knowledge that
a direct appeal to the Supreme Court potentially lies at the end
of the case affect litigant or judicial behavior? Probably not a
great deal. Aware that the Supreme Court summarily disposes
of most such appeals, attorneys may take some greater care in
properly litigating the case. But the effort probably does not
differ significantly from a voting rights case before a single
district judge. Likewise, the three-judge panel may be little
affected, too, knowing that statistically most cases are .not
appealed, and of those that are, most receive mere summary
treatment.
8 3
universally, that the Roe Court's timing was poor. See, e.g., Ruth Bader Ginsburg, Some
Thoughts on Autonomy and Equality in Relation to Roe v. Wade, 63 N.C. L. REV. 375,
379-81 (1985) (noting that the Roe decision "ventured too far in the change it ordered"
at a time when "abortion law was in a state of change across the nation"); Ruth Bader
Ginsburg, Speaking in a Judicial Voice, 67 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1185, 1199-1209 (1992)
(arguing that a "less encompassing Roe, one that merely struck down the extreme Texas
law and went no further on that day, I believe ... might have served to reduce rather
than to fuel controversy"). But see Barry Friedman, Judicial Review and Dialogue, 91
MICH. L. REV. 577, 647-48, 658-68 (1993) (arguing that judicial decisions, such as Roe,
create a dialogue between courts and legislatures, allowing political testing of the
finality of judicial lawmaking). It is argued that states were moving slowly to a more
pro-choice stance, a development impoverished by the inflexible rules set out in Roe. Had
constitutional attacks on state statutes restricting access to abortion percolated in the
lower courts-particularly the circuit courts-the timing, content, and acceptance of the
Supreme Court's eventual disposition of the issue might have been different. Cf.
Christopher Z. Mooney & Mei-Hsien Lee, Legislating Morality in the American States:
The Case of Pre-Roe Abortion Regulatory Reform, 39 AM. J. POL. SCI. 599 (1995)
(discussing influences on state abortion law in the years just prior to Roe). For a recent,
skeptical review of the posited argument, see Neal Devins, The Countermajoritarian
Paradox, 93 MICH. L. REV. 1433, 1446-48 (1995) (book review) (discussing the author's
evidence that suggested that legislative efforts to legalize abortion had, at best, mixed
results).
181. See, e.g., Edelman v. Jordan, 415 U.S. 651, 670-71 (1974).
182. See STERN ET AL., supra note 128, at 215-21. Compare Morse v. Republican
Party, 116 S. Ct. 1186, 1198 n.21 (1996) (Stevens, J.) (discounting precedential
significance of earlier summary affirmance of three-judge district court decision), with
id. at 1225 (Thomas, J., dissenting) ("The affirmance of that holding, which is entitled
to precedential weight, is instructive here." (footnote omitted)), and Bush v. Vera, 116
S. Ct. 1941, 1974 (1996) (Thomas, J., concurring) (arguing that summary affirmance of
previous three-judge district court decision does not "eviscerate the explicit holding" of
another case).
183. Cf Michael E. Solimine, Revitalizing Interlocutory Appeals in the Federal
Courts, 58 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 1165, 1179 (1990) (arguing that federal district judges
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III. ADMINISTRATIVE ASPECTS OF THE
THREE-JUDGE DISTRICT COURT
No bright line separates those attributes of three-judge district
court litigation derived from the text and structure of the
statute, and those mainly a function of the internal operation
of the court. Nonetheless, this dichotomy serves as a rough
handle to evaluate the external and internal operations of the
three-judge court. This Part discusses the internal operation of
the three-judge district court.
A. Membership
Under § 2284 and its predecessor statutes, the chief judge of
the circuit plays the major role in determining the membership
of the three-judge district court. In present practice, one member
of the court is the district judge before whom the action was
originally filed. The chief judge of the circuit then designates
"two other judges, at least one of whom shall be a circuit
judge."" 4 No other criteria are mentioned in the statute or in
any applicable rule of procedure. On its face, then, the statute
gives essentially unfettered discretion to the chief judge to fill
the two vacancies. As Professor Pamela Karlan has observed,
this discretion grants a results-oriented chiefjudge the opportu-
nity to "stack" a three-judge court with members to effectuate
a particular policy outcome.
185
Karlan draws on the evidence of stacking that apparently
occurred in the Fifth Circuit in the early 1960s.18 6 During that
period, of course, the states of the Old South were the focus of
the civil rights movement, and the federal trial and appellate
judges in those states heard many cases arising out of this
movement. Some of that litigation consisted of challenges to
are, in general, little affected by the "threat" of appellate review, given, inter alia,
relatively low rates of appeal and high rates of affirmances).
184. 28 U.S.C. § 2284(b)(1) (1994).
185. See Karlan, supra note 81, at 1729.
186. Excellent accounts of the struggle in the Fifth Circuit are found in BARROW &
WALKER, supra note 68, at 38-41,55-60 and JACK BAss, UNLIKELY HEROES 231-47 (1981).
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state-wide segregationist statutes or policies and thus required
the convening of a three-judge district court.187 Elbert Tuttle, an
Eisenhower appointee from Georgia who had progressive views
on civil rights,'8 8 was the chief judge of the Fifth Circuit during
this period. Some contended that Chief Judge Tuttle would pack
three-judge district courts with jurists who shared his political
views to ensure a particular result. The most vociferous propo-
nent of this view was Circuit Judge Ben Cameron of Mississippi,
another Eisenhower appointee who, unlike Chief Judge Tuttle,
allied himself with opponents of the Civil Rights movement.8 9
Judge Cameron felt that Chief Judge Tuttle intentionally (and
unfairly) failed to assign him to three-judge courts, and he
registered his objections in a published opinion. 9 ° By letter to
the other Fifth Circuit judges, Chief Judge Tuttle admitted to
the practice of generally not assigning Judge Cameron as a
circuit member of three-judge panels. While the Chief Judge
claimed concern for Judge Cameron's health (Cameron had heart
problems), he also argued that Judge Cameron's judicial philoso-
phy had a" 'legitimate and proper bearing on the basis on which
[he determined] what judges are to be assigned to special three-
judge courts.""' Even Chief Judge Tuttle's putatively ideological
allies on the Fifth Circuit appeared troubled by the debate, and
187. See BARROW & WALKER, supra note 68, at 124-25 (discussing the high number
of three-judge district court cases in the Fifth Circuit in the 1960s).
188. See id. at 12-14.
189. See id. at 18-20, 42-44; BASS, supra note 186, at 84-96. Two Cameron dissents
were particularly noteworthy. In United States v. Wood, 295 F.2d 772 (5th Cir. 1961),
he accused the majority of causing "the people of the southland to look upon federal
functionaries .. .as 'alien intruders.'" Id. at 788 (Cameron, J. dissenting) (internal
citation omitted). In Boman v. Birmingham Transit Co., 292 F.2d 4 (5th Cir. 1961), he
further commented that Southerners expected "the judges who function in [the] circuit
* . .[to] render justice in individual cases against a background of, and as interpreters
of, the ethos of the people whose servants they are." Id. at 28 (Cameron, J., dissenting).
190. See Armstrong v. Board of Educ., 323 F.2d 333, 352-61 (5th Cir. 1963)
(Cameron, J., dissenting) (stating that in 22 of 25 cases involving racial issues, some
combination of the same four judges was appointed to the panel), cert. denied, 376 U.S.
908 (1964).
191. BARROW & WALKER, supra note 68, at 56-57 (quoting Letter from Elbert P.
Tuttle, C.J., to Joseph C. Hutcheson, Jr., Richard T. Rives, Ben F. Cameron, Warren
L. Jones, John R. Brown, John Minor Wisdom, Walter P. Gewin, and Griffin B. Bell (Nov.
28, 1962); see also BASS, supra note 186, at 246 (quoting Tuttle saying, "Well, I got in
the habit of appointing two circuit judges ordinarily because there were not too many
district judges who were yet attuned to the problems that we felt were necessary to face.").
Another related reason Chief Judge Tuttle was hesitant to appoint Judge Cameron to
three-judge district court cases arising from Mississippi was that at least two district
judges from that state (before whom the case was often filed) largely shared Judge
Cameron's views. See BARROW & WALKER, supra note 68, at 39-40.
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in 1963 the court as a whole adopted more formal procedures
to assign judges to such courts on a more-or-less random ba-
sis. 192 But by then, the crisis had generally dissipated.
It is not difficult to understand the troubling nature of the
Tuttle-Cameron dispute. Although apparently not mandated by
statute or rule, the courts of appeals have long adhered to a
practice of randomly assigning judges to sit on three-member
panels. 193 If a chief judge packed panels explicitly to achieve
desired policy objectives, it would no doubt generate opposi-
tion.1'9 Although Chief Judge Tuttle, with laudable candor,
virtually admitted to keeping Judge Cameron off three-judge
district courts, that does not mean necessarily that he was
packing such courts. J. Woodford Howard, in his study of the
Second, Fifth, and District of Columbia Circuits in the 1960s
and 1970s, found some evidence that chief judges did compose
three-judge courts "in tune with [their] policy preferences." 95
That is, he found that certain judges were assigned to those
courts more or less often than one would expect if assignment
were made on a random basis.'96 But the evidence was not
conclusive, and observers seemed to agree that such practices
have largely faded.'97
Certainly, the smaller number of three-judge courts convened
after the 1976 amendment presents a chief judge with fewer
opportunities to compose or to pack such courts. Indeed, the
drafters of the 1976 amendment were, perhaps, not entirely
oblivious to the Tuttle-Cameron controversy. The House Report
states-perhaps optimistically-that in composing three-judge
courts, "the role of the chief judge is entirely ministerial."'98
192. See BARROW & WALKER, supra note 68, at 60.
193. See Michael E. Solimine, Ideology and En Banc Review, 67 N.C. L. REV. 29, 39
n.52 (1988).
194. See Henry J. Friendly, Of Voting Blocs, and Cabbages and Kings, 42 U. CIN.
L. REV. 673,675 (1973) (arguing that if packing were attempted the response from other
circuit judges "would be vigorous").
195. HOWARD, supra note 3, at 256.
196. See id. at 240 n.p, 245 n.u.
197. See id. at 241-47. Even if we ascribe result-oriented motivations to Chief Judge
Tuttle, his alleged packing of three-judge district courts did not always work. In an
important apportionment case, he assigned himself and Circuit Judge Griffin Bell (who
had a generally pro-civil rights voting record) to the court, but Tuttle found himself in
dissent when Bell and the district judge found for the defendant. See Wesberry v.
Vandiver, 206 F. Supp. 276 (N.D. Ga. 1962), rev'd sub nom. Wesberry v. Sanders, 376
U.S. 1 (1964).
198. H.R. REP. No. 94-1379, at 7 (1976). Perhaps fewer cases can make packing by
a chief judge more, not less, likely. With a larger pool of cases, a chief judge might be
more likely to develop formal criteria for appointment. If these criteria were not used
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To get a sense of the criteria employed by chief judges today,
I made inquiries of those judges of the twelve circuits; either the
chiefjudge or circuit executives from eight circuits responded.' 99
All the responses indicated that no formal assignment guidelines
existed or were utilized. Informally, however, the common
practice was, if possible, to compose three-judge panels of two
district judges with most or all of the three judges from the state
in question.2 °° The principal reasons for this practice were that
it was more convenient for local judges to convene in that state
and that local judges presumably would be more knowledgeable
about the facts.2"' Other factors such as workload and schedules
were also taken into account.20 2 Two circuits added that there
was an attempt to balance the panels politically°-in an effort,
one presumes, to create the appearance, and actuality, of fair-
ness. There were no allusions to packing of three-judge courts,
and in fact, many responses indicate explicit attempts to avoid
it, at least if one makes the reasonable assumption that "bal-
ance" is at some odds with the result-oriented aspect of packing.
In an effort to further examine the benign picture of com-
posing three-judge district courts presented by the circuits (as
in certain types of cases, these breaks with procedure might well be noticeable. With
a smaller number of assignments, formal appointment criteria might be less likely to
arise, thereby making the appointment power subject to greater manipulation.
199. The inquiries were made by letter in the spring of 1995; seven of the responses
were by letter, one by phone. All responses are on file with the University of Michigan
Journal of Law Reform. The Fourth, Fifth, Tenth, and Eleventh circuits did not respond.
200. See, e.g., Letter from Mark A. Butler, Special Assistant to Harry T. Edwards,
C.J., United States Court of Appeals for the D.C. Circuit, to Michael E. Solimine, Donald
P. Klekamp Professor of Law, University of Cincinnati College of Law, (Apr. 19, 1995)
(on file with the University of Michigan Journal of Law Reform); Letter from Collins T.
Fitzpatrick, Circuit Executive, United States Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit,
to Michael E. Solimine, Donald P. Klekamp Professor of Law, University of Cincinnati
College of Law (Apr. 6, 1995) (on file with the University of Michigan Journal of Law
Reform); Letter from Chief Judge Jon 0. Neuman, C.J., United States Court of Appeals
for the Second Circuit, to Michael E. Solimine, Donald P. Klekamp Professor of Law,
University of Cincinnati College of Law (Mar. 30, 1995) (on file with the University of
Michigan Journal of Law Reform); Letter from Delores K Sloviter, C.J., United States
Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit, to Michael E. Solimine, Donald P. Klekamp
Professor of Law, University of Cincinnati College of Law (Mar. 30, 1995) (on file with
the University of Michigan Journal of Law Reform).
201. See, e.g., Letter from Richard S. Arnold, C.J., United States Court of Appeals
for the Eighth Circuit, to Michael E. Solimine, Donald P. Klekamp Professor of Law,
University of Cincinnati College of Law (Apr. 3, 1995) (on file with the University of
Michigan Journal of Law Reform); Telephone Interview with Gilbert S. Merritt, C.J.,
United States Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit (Apr. 6, 1995).
202. See Telephone Interview with Gilbert S. Merritt, C.J., supra note 201.
203. See id.; Letter from Collins T. Fitzpatrick to Michael E. Solimine, supra note
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well as other matters addressed in this Part of the Article), I
analyzed published decisions of three-judge courts after the 1976
amendment. I attempted to obtain all such decisions, and a
computer search yielded eighty-nine cases.
20 4
Some of the results of that analysis are found in Table 3. Of
the eighty-nine cases, only five had two circuit judges rather
than one. And of those eighty-nine, seventy-three had all three
judges from the state in question, with an additional fourteen
cases having one judge not from the state. The cases only rarely
stated the name of the district judge before whom the case was
originally filed, °5 so it was impossible to determine which judges
were picked to fill out the entire panel. Nonetheless, we can
roughly infer from the data in Table 3 that, on the whole, a
highly politicized composition process has not taken place.
Because the chiefjudges overwhelmingly picked only one circuit
judge to compose the panel, they were picking one member (i.e.,
the other district judge) whom they presumably knew less well.
Likewise, most of the cases had all the members from the state
in question, further suggesting that chief judges did not go
outside the state to give them more chances to pack the panel.
In contrast, it is worth noting that Judge Tuttle was accused of
and, in part, confessed to picking judges from outside the state
and to picking two circuit judges to fill out the panel.0 6
Still, these are just trends, and more intensive case studies-
beyond the scope of this Article-might find evidence of some
204. See Search of WESTLAW, Allfeds Library (Summer 1995); see also infra app.
The WESTLAW search I employed was: "2284" & Three w/2 Judge! & vot! w/2 right!
& date (aft 11111976). The search yielded about 153 cases, of which only 109 were those
of three-judge district courts. Of those, another 20 were deleted as they did not address
the merits or were otherwise irrelevant to the present study. The search has the virtue
of being systematic, but of course caution still must be taken in interpreting any data,
because I did not gather unpublished opinions, and not all published opinions of three-
judge courts are necessarily captured by the search. For example, the list does not
include the three-judge court decision reviewed in Presley v. Etowah County Comm'n,
502 U.S. 491 (1992), a Voting Rights Act case, because the lower court decision was not
published. It is doubtful that such omissions skew the data presented here, however,
because most important decisions of federal district courts are published. See Francine
Sanders, Brown v. Board of Education: An Empirical Reexamination of Its Effects on
Federal District Courts, 29 L. & Soc'y REV. 731, 740-41 (1995); cf. Susan M. Olson,
Studying Federal District Courts Through Published Cases: A Research Note, 15 JUST.
Sys. J. 782, 795-97 (1992) (questioning the use only of published cases when researching
federal district courts). One would assume that most three-judge district court decisions
reviewed by the Supreme Court would be officially published, as are almost all cases
reviewed by the Court.
205. Only five of the 89 cases indicated who was the original district judge.
206. See BARROw & WALKER, supra note 68, at 39-40, 55-56; BASS, supra note 186,
at 246.
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sort of packing. Consider the Voinovich litigation, discussed
earlier.20 7 In 1991 Chief Judge Gilbert Merritt of the Sixth
Circuit (a Democratic appointee) named Democratic appointees,
Circuit Judges Nathaniel Jones and Senior Judge John Peck,
both from Ohio, to join Ohio District Judge David Dowd (a
Republican appointee) on the panel. Thereafter, Judge Peck
passed away, and Merritt named Senior Circuit Judge Anthony
Celebrezze, another Democratic appointee from Ohio, to
complete the panel. On its face, these appointments present
slim evidence of packing. At best, it might be said that Judge
Merritt was merely attempting to bring some perceived
partisan balance to the panel.20 8 Moreover, Judge Merritt may
well have taken into equal or greater account the schedules,
workloads, or expected recusals of other eligible judges, or
other factors far afield from partisanship.2 9 Still, given the
other federal district and circuit judges from Ohio available for
appointment,210 one wonders if the factor of political balance
was given extra weight.
207. See supra text accompanying notes 148-57.
208. See Telephone Interview with Gilbert S. Merritt, C.J., supra note 201. I should
add that I did not ask Judge Merritt about the composition of the three-judge panel in
Voinovich or any other particular case.
209. See id. Judge Merritt mentioned that in making appointments he took into
account, among many other factors, how fact-intensive the case was likely to be. The
more of a "law-developing," appellate-like case it might be, the more he was inclined (in
balance with other factors) to appoint two circuit judges. See id.
Another reason to be cautious about drawing stark ideological implications from the
Voinovich case is that while the plaintiffs are affiliated with the Democratic Party,
some Democrats (including some African-American elected officials) supported the
defendants. See Karlan, supra note 75, at 269.
210. By my count, as of the early 1990s, there were the following Ohio federal
judges who, in theory, could have been appointed to serve with Judge Dowd on
Voinovich: democratic appointed District Judges Lambros, Battisti, White, Aldrich,
Holschuh, Rice, Spiegel; republican appointed District Judges Bell, Potter, Matia,
Rubin, Weber, Graham, Smith, Manos; republican appointed Circuit Judges Nelson,
Norris, Batchelder, Contie. All three Democratic appointed Circuit Judges-Jones,
Celebrezze, and Peck-were appointed to the case. For a listing of these judges and
their dates of appointment to the federal bench, see 950 F.2d xviii-xx (1991).
Cf. Miller v. Ohio, Case No. C-2-94-116 (filed Nov. 18, 1994). The case alleges that
there was an unconstitutional bipartisan political gerrymander of Ohio's congressional
districts after the 1990 census. The original District Judge, George Smith, is a Republi-
can appointee, and District Judge Walter Rice (Democratic appointee) and Circuit
Judge Alan Norris (Republican appointee) were named to fill out the panel. In 1996,
the court unanimously granted the defendants' motion to dismiss. See Miller v. Ohio,
Case No. C-2-94-1116 (May 29, 1996) (slip op. on file with the University of Michigan
Journal of Law Reform), aff'd mem., 65 U.S.L.W. 3398 (U.S. Dec. 3, 1996) (No. 96-471).
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B. Status and Decisionmaking
No matter the process of assignment, the three-judge district
court will consist of a mix of trial and appellate judges. The
unique combination of judges raises two significant questions:
does this grouping of judges, at the trial level, contribute
positively to the decision of the court? And does the combina-
tion of judges from different levels in the judicial hierarchy
affect the collective decisionmaking of the court?
With regard to the first question, recall that the drafters of
the statute211 thought that three judicial minds, deciding collec-
tively, would lead to a better result than just one.212 This
intuition seems reasonable enough, and is reflected in the
widespread system of establishing multi-member appellate
courts. But it is by no means clear that a trial level decision is
aided by use of a three-member court. The prevalent practice
among state and federal courts is to have a single jurist at the
trial level.2" 3 Given the factfinding that typically occurs at the
trial level, it is difficult to believe that increasing the number
of decisionmakers, in itself, leads to easier, quicker, or more
accurate findings. Likewise, as noted before, the facts present-
ed in modern voting rights cases often consist of sophisticated
and complicated expert testimony, requiring findings of fact to
be grounded in statistics and mathematical models. 214 It is
unusual to find trial and appellate judges of courts of general
jurisdiction who are conversant in such methodologies.
215
211. 28 U.S.C. § 2284 (1994).
212. See supra notes 26-30 and accompanying text.
213. See Currie, supra note 20, at 1. One recent exception to this general rule is the
use of three-judge trial courts to hear death penalty cases where the accused has
waived the right to a jury trial. See, e.g., OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 2945.06 (Anderson
1993). See also Robert Brundin, Letter, NEWSWEEK, Oct. 30, 1995, at 16 (suggesting
that one solution to the criticisms of the O.J. Simpson trial "would be to replace the
jury with a three-judge panel that would be capable of umpiring the cleverness of the
legal protagonists").
Three-judge trial courts are also common in civil law systems. See MARY ANN
GLENDON ET AL., COMPARATIVE LEGAL TRADITIONS IN A NUTSHELL 64-65 (1982)
(describing procedures in German and French trial courts). Even in those countries
there has been some movement toward single-judge trial courts. See, e.g., John
Langbein, The German Advantage in Civil Procedure, 52 U. CHI. L. REV. 823, 827 n.13
(1985) (noting that one reason for movement was slowness of three-judge panels as
compared to one judge).
214. See supra notes 89-90 and accompanying text.
215. Historically, the federal court system has placed decisionmaking of similarly
sophisticated, specialized matters, like patent or tax litigation, before specialized
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Still, as the debate in the 1970s over abolishing the three-
judge district court demonstrated, many observers feel that
fact-finding in voting rights cases is apt to be relatively
straight-forward, with the case instead dominated by legal
issues.216 In that case, a multi-member court is more appro-
priate. This debate is insoluble, and generalizations about voting
rights litigation are not likely to be helpful. Indeed, much
federal question litigation before federal district courts, single-
judge or not, is likely to pose complicated factfinding questions
as well as difficult questions of law. 217 The difference on this
score between the single-judge cases and voting rights cases
before three-judge courts is not likely to be of a quantum
nature.218
A second, related set of problems concerns the interpersonal
dynamics of temporarily grouping judges from different levels
of the federal court system. As we saw, such a mixture can be
justified given the putatively dual nature of voting rights
cases.219 District judges will bring their greater experience and
expertise in trial procedure and factfinding, while appellate
judges will bring their skills in developing the law.22' That
courts, staffed by judges who hear only these types of cases. See generally Rochelle
Cooper Dreyfuss, Specialized Adjudication, 1990 BYU L. REV. 377 (discussing the
history and future of specialized courts); Richard L. Revesz, Specialized Courts and the
Administrative Lawmaking System, 138 U. PA. L. REV. 1111 (1990) (discussing the
merits and varieties of specialized courts). To my knowledge, few if any of these courts,
past or present, had multi-member panels as the initial adjudicators.
216. See generally discussion supra Part I.B.
217. One specialized trial tribunal, the Judicial Panel on Multi-District Litigation,
consists of seven members, with both trial and appellate judges. See 28 U.S.C. § 1407(d)
(1988). That court deals with motions to transfer and consolidate litigation, however,
and engages in little if any factfinding as such. See Patricia D. Howard, A Guide to
Multidistrict Litigation, 124 F.R.D. 479 (1989); J.P.M.L.R. 16 (describing motion
practice).
218. Consider the extensive and lengthy discussion of the facts by the majority,
plurality, and dissenting opinions of the two racial gerrymandering cases decided at the
end of the 1995 Term. See Bush v. Vera, 116 S. Ct. 1941, 1952-60 (1996) (plurality
opinion); id. at 1979-89 (Stevens, J., dissenting); Shaw v. Hunt, 116 S. Ct. 1894, 1903-07
(1996) (majority opinion); id. at 1912-20 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
219. Cf supra note 91 and accompanying text.
220. See RICHARD A. POSNER, THE FEDERAL COURTS: CRISIS AND REFORM 11-15
(1985) (discussing the respective skills of trial and appellate judges); Lewis A.
Kornhauser, Adjudication by a Resource-Constrained Team: Hierarchy and Precedent
in a Judicial System, 68 S. CAL. L. REV. 1605, 1619 n.29, 1620 n.30 (1995) (suggesting
that collegial judging is more appropriate for law-finding than for fact-finding); see also
First Options of Chicago, Inc. v. Kaplan, 115 S. Ct. 1920, 1926 (1995) (noting the
'respective institutional advantages of trial and appellate courts") (internal citation
omitted); Kimi Lynn King et al., Voting Rights and Wrongs: Federal District Court
Decision Making, 1965-93 (Sept. 1996) (unpublished paper presented at the annual
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apparent advantage may be diluted by the effect of the status
of the participants. Small-group theory predicts that junior
members of temporary decisionmaking bodies (i.e., those with
lesser status) may defer to the member who possesses greater
status.22' On a three-judge district court, such deference might
be manifested by the district judges voting with the circuit
judge, or with the latter judge writing most of the opinions.
Additionally, the district judges, mindful that their decisions in
other cases will be reviewed by their circuit counterpart, may
be motivated to reduce any perceived offense by voting with the
appellate jurist.
222
Two studies of federal courts have brought empirical evidence
to bear on these assumptions. The first, by Thomas G. Walker,
examined voting behavior among judges on three-judge district
courts in the 1960s.223 Walker found some support for these
assumptions, as the appeals judge issued a written opinion in
sixty-four percent of the cases, when randomly we would expect
them to author only about a third.224 He also found that appeals
judges were least likely to dissent in such cases, as they receive
the most support for their opinions. 225 A second study, by
Richard Saphire and me, examined similar issues in the context
of district judges sitting by designation on the circuit courts of
appeals.226 Using a data base of all appellate dispositions
meeting of the American Political Science Association on file with the University of
Michigan Journal of Law Reform) (attributing differences in voting behavior of federal
district and circuit judges in cases raising voting issues to, inter alia, the possibility that
district judges are "more attuned to micro-level details of the case," while circuit judges
are more "accustomed to clarifying the legal rules for the trial courts").
221. See ROBERTA. CARP & RONALD STIDHAM, THE FEDERAL COURTS 173-98 (2d ed.
1991) (applying small-group analysis to multi-judge decisionmaking); Thomas G. Walker,
Behavior of Temporary Members in Small Groups, J. APPLIED PSYCHOL., Aug. 1973, at
144 (same).
222. See generally Lewis A. Kornhauser & Lawrence G. Sager, The One and the
Many: Adjudication in Collegial Courts, 81 CAL. L. REv. 1, 51-56 (1993) (discussing
whether strategic voting behavior takes place in multi-judge courts).
223. See Thomas G. Walker, Behavioral Tendencies in the Three-Judge District Court,
17 MIDWEST J. POL. Sci. 407 (1973). Walker studied 56 published decisions of such
courts rendered between 1963 and 1968 involving civil liberties. He excluded per curiam
opinions, cases with more than one appeals judge sitting, and cases where it was
impossible to ascertain the identity of the original district judge from the opinion. See
id. at 411.
224. See id. at 411-12.
225. See id. at 412-13.
226. See Richard B. Saphire & Michael E. Solimine, Diluting Justice On Appeal?:
An Examination of the Use of District Judges Sitting by Designation on the United States
Courts of Appeals, 28 U. MICH. J.L. REFORM 351 (1995).
118
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227(published and unpublished) between 1987 and 1992, we
found, on a number of dimensions, no great differences between
appellate panels that had or did not have a district judge sitting
by designation. For example, we found that there was virtually
no difference as to the reversal rate of district courts between
the two types of appellate panels.22 In contrast, we did find that
district judges sitting by designation appeared to author dis-
proportionately fewer majority, concurring, or dissenting opin-
ions.22 9 Although examining a different institution, our study is
arguably in some tension with Walker's study with regard to the
apparently stark deference by districtjudges found by the latter.
In an effort to replicate and update Walker's study, I culled
similar data from the post-1976 collection of eighty-nine cases
heard by the Supreme Court. Some of the data is collected in
Table 4. Of the eighty-nine cases, more than a third were per
230curiam opinions, 0 and another eight were jointly signed opin-
231 terions. Of the remaining cases, there was a split between
those authored by a circuit judge and those by a district judge.
Likewise, there were roughly equal numbers of concurring and
227. The data base was compiled by the Administrative Office of the United States
Courts and made accessible by the Federal Judicial Center. A detailed description of the
data base is found in Saphire & Solimine, supra note 226, at 368 & n.65.
228. There was an overall reversal rate of 17.92%, compared to a rate of 18.30% for
panels with judges sitting by designation. See id. at 369.
229. The designated district judges authored about 18% of the opinions of the panels
on which they sat and authored concurring or dissenting opinions in 2.0% and 1.6% of
the cases, respectively. In contrast, we would expect any given judge to author about
33% of the opinions of panels on which she sat, and studies have shown that such judges
concur or dissent in about 3% of the cases. See id. at 370 & nn.71-72. An earlier study,
using published opinions decided between 1965 and 1969, reached conclusions largely
similar to the Saphire and Solimine study. See Justin J. Green & Burton M. Atkins,
Designated Judges: How Well Do They Perform?, 61 JUDICATURE 358, 368-69 (1978)
(finding that visitingjudges file 1.3% ofdissenting opinions and 1.3% of concurring opin-
ions and district judges file 7.0% of dissenting opinions and 4.8% of concurring opinions
while circuit judges write 84% of dissenting opinions and 85.6% of concurring opinions).
230. In appellate panel dispositions, relatively few of the opinions are per curiam.
See, e.g., 1992 DIRECTOR OF ADMIN. OFFICE OF THE U.S. COURTS ANN. REP., tbl. S-3
(reporting that for the year ending Sept. 30, 1992, only 650 of 6330 published opinions
were unsigned). Per curiam opinions frequently are thought to dispose of a case that
does not need extended factual or legal discussion. See HOWARD, supra note 3, at 14;
Stephen L. Wasby et al., The Per Curiam Opinion: Its Nature and Functions, 76
JUDICATURE 29, 29-30 (1992). In contrast, the prevalence of such opinions by three-
judge district courts is probably more a function of the desire to present a united
front, or to prepare an opinion perhaps jointly authored in an expeditious manner.
231. Perhaps the best known jointly signed opinions are Planned Parenthood of
Southeastern Pa. v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833 (1992) (joint opinion of O'Connor, Kennedy &
Souter, JJ.) (abortion); Gregg v. Georgia, 428 U.S. 153 (1976) (joint opinion of Stewart,
Powell & Stevens, JJ.) (death penalty); and Cooper v. Aaron, 358 U.S. 1 (1958) (joint
opinion of entire court) (school desegregation).
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dissenting opinions by district and circuit judges. Overall,
there seems little evidence of the deference in opinion writing
identified by Walker. Rather, the members of three-judge
courts appear to contribute on a roughly proportional basis to
the writing of opinions. To be sure, if we leave aside the per
curiam opinions, and consider that the vast majority of cases
consist of two district judges and one circuit judge, then circuit
judges author more than their share. But the difference is not
strong. Moreover, perhaps the data indicates that the notion of
deference in this context is overblown. These judges are men
and women who enjoy life tenure,2 32 and district judges enjoy
significant prestige of their own. Given these circumstances, it
is not hard to believe that district judges do not feel a need to
be excessively deferential to their appellate colleagues in
decisionmaking on three-judge courts.
C. Ideology and Decisionmaking
As we have seen in earlier parts of this Article, the creation
of and litigation before three-judge district courts is often
predicated, at least in part, on the presumed ideological mindset
of the jurists who make up the court. The drafters of the original
legislation thought three judges would be more sensitive to
issues of federalism. The opponents of total repeal in the 1970s
felt that such courts would be more protective of civil rights
than single judges.233 Some of the composers of these courts
appear to give weight to the predilections of the candidates for
appointment to the court. And litigators have opportunities to
maneuver to bring their cases before judges who they perceive
are predisposed to their cause.
Almost all participants or observers of the legal system
indulge in these presumptions, and almost always the predic-
tions are based on anecdotal evidence of past decisional behavior
by judges.234 As more fully described below, there have been
232. See U.S. CONST. art. III, § 1.
233. See supra notes 64-68 and accompanying text.
234. For example, the drafters of the original three-judge district court provisions
and of the 1976 amendment did not rely on statistical evidence of the voting behavior
of district judges sitting alone as compared to that of three-judge appellate panels, or
(in the case of the 1976 amendment) that of three-judge district courts. Instead, the
evidence utilized was heavily anecdotal. See generally supra Part I.A-B (discussing the
legislative history of 28 U.S.C. § 2284 and predecessor statutes).
Voting Rights and Three-Judge District Courts 121
some efforts to measure on a more systematic basis whether
certain judges vote in predictable ways. For purposes of this
Article, one relevant variable would be whether federal judges
appointed by Democratic administrations are more likely to vote
consistent with their party affiliations on issues such as voting
rights before three-judge courts, and whether Republican-
appointed judges show similar consistency. A considerable body
of literature purports to demonstrate such associations for
Supreme Court Justices235 and lower federal court judges.236 But
there is hardly a consensus on the point. Skeptics point out that
the asserted "liberal" voting of a Democratic-appointed Justice
may result at least in part from following precedent.237 More
recent studies of federal judges on the circuit and district courts,
covering large numbers of both published and unpublished
decisions, demonstrate at most a weak association between
political background and ideological voting behavior.23 Federal
judges themselves repeatedly decry the picture of a highly
politicized judiciary.239
At the same time, even supporters of the view that federal
court decisionmaking is "principled" and largely free of political
bias concede that personal and partisan philosophy can control
at the margins. 2 ° Perhaps modern three-judge district court
cases, highly charged with political importance, are more likely
235. See, e.g., JEFFREY A. SEGAL & HAROLD J. SPAETH, THE SUPREME COURT AND
THE ATTITUDINAL MODEL (1993).
236. See, e.g., Robert A. Carp et al., The Voting Behavior of Judges Appointed by
President Bush, 76 JUDICATURE 298, 298-302 (1993) (showing through empirical data,
generalizations about the ideology of judges appointed by President Bush).
237. See generally Eskridge & Frickey, supra note 178, at 33-36 (arguing that
decisions of Supreme Court Justices are usually explainable as a combination of the force
of precedent, the substantive policy preferences of the Justices, and the Justices'
perceptions of institutional competence); Tracey E. George & Lee Epstein, On the Nature
of Supreme Court Decision Making, 86 AM. POL. SCI. REV. 323 (1992) (arguing that both
"legal" and ideological arguments affect judicial decisionmaking).
238. See, e.g., Orley Ashenfelter et al., Politics and the Judiciary: The Influence of
Judicial Background on Case Outcomes, 24 J. LEGAL STUD. 257, 281 (1995) (finding that
the political background of federal judges did not correlate with judges' treatment of civil
rights cases).
239. See, e.g., Harry T. Edwards, The Judicial Function and the Elusive Goal of
Principled Decision Making, 1991 Wis. L. REV. 837; Alvin B. Rubin, Does Law Matter?
A Judge's Response to the Critical Legal Studies Movement, 37 J. LEGAL EDUC. 307
(1987); see also Tyson v. Trigg, 50 F.3d 436, 439 (7th Cir. 1995) (Posner, J.), cert. denied,
116 S. Ct. 697 (1996).
240. See Friendly, supra note 194, at 677 (asserting that it is incorrect to assume
"that judges regularly vote on ideological lines; it is only in the closest cases that such
attitudes may tip the balance").
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to be among these cases at the margins. Recently, Randall Lloyd
has tested this assumption empirically. 241' He initially observed
that most political science studies of federal judicial behavior
have assumed that the judge's ideological values are the same
as of the President that appointed her.242 But broad use of
ideological labels becomes particularly dicey when reapportion-
ment cases are considered. Lloyd persuasively argues that the
usual social science stereotypes (Democratic appointees vote
liberal, Republican appointees vote conservative) 243 fail in this
context unless we first consider the specific partisan background
and nature of the apportionment plan under review. Only then
can we rationally attempt to link the judges' vote in presumed
support of their party.244 Lloyd examined forty-four three-judge
district court cases involving apportionment, decided between
1964 and 1983, and he did find a strong correlation between
political background and support, or rejection, of the plan in
question.24 5 He did not examine Voting Rights Act cases.246
Lloyd's study suggests that reapportionment cases are indeed
the marginal cases where partisanship plays some role, con-
sciously or otherwise, in judicial decisionmaking. But his study
is not the last word, as his data are somewhat outdated and do
not address Voting Rights Act cases.247 The limits of the present
study prevented a replication of Lloyd's methodology for the
reapportionment cases arising out of the 1990 census. That
would have required an in-depth examination of the advantages
241. See Randall D. Lloyd, Separating Partisanship from Party in Judicial Research:
Reapportionment in the U.S. District Courts, 89 AM. POL. Sci. REV. 413,417-19 (1995).
An earlier study compared apportionment cases decided in state supreme courts with
three-judge district courts in the time between Baker v. Carr, 369 U.S. 186 (1962), and
Reynolds v. Sims, 377 U.S. 533 (1964). See Edward N. Beiser, A Comparative Analysis
of State and Federal Judicial Behavior: The Reapportionment Cases, 62 AM. POL. SCI.
REV. 788, 790 n.11 (1968). Beiser's working assumption that the state courts would be
much less sympathetic than federal courts to reapportionment claims was not borne out.
See id. at 794. Beiser did not directly address allegedly partisan voting on the federal
tribunals.
242. See Lloyd, supra note 241, at 413.
243. See Solimine, supra note 193, at 37 n.44 (describing how political scientists have
defined these terms operationally when studying judicial voting behavior).
244. See Lloyd, supra note 241, at 415.
245. See id. at 417-18.
246. See id. at 414-15.
247. Cf Karlan, supra note 81, at 1737 (contending that the Republican politicization
of the lower federal judiciary in the 1980s would have an important effect on voting
rights cases); King et al., supra note 220, at 22 (finding support for the assumption that
the partisanship of the appointing President is a good predictor of federal judges'
decisionmaking in cases raising voting issues decided between 1965 and 1993).
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provided each political party in each state in the drawing of
state and congressional legislative districts. In contrast, Voting
Rights Act cases are more accessible. Generally speaking, such
claims are brought by minority plaintiffs to enforce the voting
claims of minorities. A vote for a plaintiff under the Act can
generally be aligned with liberal ideology. Because three-judge
courts, of course, vote as a group, it also seems reasonable to
consider the votes in that manner.
A review of judicial behavior and outcomes from the eighty-
nine cases under study is provided in Table 5. As the Table
indicates, a large number of the cases (seventy-two) had some
sort of Voting Rights Act claim advanced. To test partisanship,
one might expect three-judge courts with a majority of Demo-
cratic appointees to hold more consistently for plaintiffs in those
cases, and the converse to be true, as well. Table 5 lends mild
support to this hypothesis. Overall, plaintiffs advancing Voting
Rights Act claims did quite well, prevailing in about two-thirds
of the cases.248 The lowest level of support was when Republican
appointees made up two of the three-member panel, but overall
the differences are not staggering, and hardly present compel-
ling evidence of systematic partisan voting behavior.249
Such lack of evidence can be compared usefully to the pur-
portedly recent upsurge in partisan judicial behavior. In Shaw
v. Reno25° and subsequent Shaw-type cases,25' with one notable
248. I regarded any sort of relief obtained by or presumably attributable to the
plaintiffs (outrightjudgment, consent decree, court ordering state legislature to resubmit
a plan) as the plaintiff "prevailing." Compare Lloyd, supra note 241, at 415 (characteriz-
ing any vote against the state legislature's plan as the plaintiff prevailing), with Weber,
supra note 88, at 225 (asserting, with little discussion, that plaintiffs rarely prevail in
voting rights litigation).
249. Although the number of decisions included in the analysis is relatively small,
it is possible to hypothesize about the probable effect of party affiliation on plaintiff
success in three judge courts. For example, we could hypothesize that courts with
Democratic majorities will decide for the plaintiff more often than courts with Republi-
can majorities. This hypothesis is based on the (admittedly crude) assumption that
"Democratic panels" will be more liberal than "Republican panels," and that plaintiffs
in such cases will, more often, be seeking a "liberal" outcome. If we do this, our data
show that plaintiffs won 32 out of 40 cases with "Democratic panels" and only 18 out
of 32 with "Republican panels." The likelihood of this difference occurring randomly is
small. Applying a chi-square test of association yields a value of 4.726, which is
significant at the .03 level. Measures of association based on chi-square thus show a
moderate association between party and plaintiff victories. On chi-square in general,
see HUBERT M. BLALOCK, JR., SOCIAL STATISTICS 279-92 (rev. 2d ed. 1979).
250. 509 US. 630 (1993).
251. For a discussion of Shaw and its progeny, see supra notes 7-9 and accompa-
nying text.
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exception,252 the Republican appointees upheld the constitutional
attack on the racially gerrymandered Congressional districts,
while Democratic appointees rejected the challenge. Convention-
al wisdom would expect this pattern, because the districts under
attack were meant to boost the election of minority members of
Congress, almost all of whom would be Democrats. Yet it is well
documented that Republican party operatives helped create
these districts in the first instance, a strategy thought attribut-
able to a desire to "pack in" minority voters, thereby increasing
the chances of Republican candidates in other districts.253 Whe-
ther these intentions have been fully realized, and whether,
given the effects of redistricting, certain minority policymakers
were foolish to engage in this putatively Faustian bargain, is a
matter of debate.25 4 But if we take the cynical view of the intent
behind these districts, how should a rational, partisan Republi-
can judicial appointee vote? Would it not be to uphold the dis-
tricts in question, so as to effectuate the plans of the drafters?25 5
252. The exception is Johnson v. Miller, 864 F. Supp. 1354 (S.D. Ga. 1994) (per
curiam), affd, 115 S. Ct. 2475 (1995). There, District Judges Edenfield and Bowen, both
Democratic appointees, held for the plaintiffs challenging the districting, see id. at 1393,
while the Republican appointee, Circuit Judge Edmondson, held for the defendants, see
id. at 1397. For a general discussion and numerous statistical descriptions of voting
behavior in recent racial redistricting cases, see Roger Hartley & W. Paige Newman
Hager, An Analysis of Judicial Decision Making in Racial Redistricting Cases (Sept.
1995) (unpublished paper presented at the annual meeting of the American Political
Science Association on file with the University of Michigan Journal of Law Reform).
The confusing nature, from a partisan perspective, of the nascent reverse-Shaw
litigation, see supra text accompanying notes 145-49, further muddies the water on the
conventional wisdom of Shaw. Cf Howard Wilkinson, Two Districts Here Likely Won't
Change, CIN. ENQUIRER, June 25, 1996, at Bi (noting that after remand of the district
court ruling in Voinovich by the Supreme Court, two black Democratic representatives
stated that "they never wanted to see their majority-black districts redrawn").
253. See Fried, supra note 4, at 66 n.355; Pildes, supra note 82, at 1380.
254. For an excellent discussion of the partisan effects of these "safe districts," see
Pildes, supra note 82, at 1365-67, 1378-89; Charles Cameron, et al., Do Majority-
Minority Districts Maximize Substantive Black Representation in Congress?, 90 AM. POL.
Sci. REv. 794, 795 (1996) (finding, inter alia, that a "trade-off does exist between
maximizing the number of black representatives in Congress and maximizing the
number of votes in favor of minority-sponsored legislation"); see also L. Marvin Overby
& Kenneth M. Cosgrove, Unintended Consequences? Racial Redistricting and the
Representation of Minority Interests, 58 J. POL. 540, 544-50 (1996) (showing that white
incumbents who lost African-American constituents because of redistricting "became less
sensitive to the concerns of African-Americans"); Carol M. Swain, The Future of Black
Representation, AM. PROSPECT 78 (Fall 1995).
255. See Pildes, supra note 82, at 1380 n.89 (quoting a Republican party official,
saying that the GOP would "be nuts" to want the districts in question modified given
the results that had been achieved). But see Issacharoff, supra note 144, at 55 n.37
(noting that the Republican National Committee "had a change of heart in 1992 as a
result of a Democratic electoral upswing triggered by the presidential election," and
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However the evidence on these questions plays out, it calls into
further doubt the use of easy partisan stereotypes to label
judges' decisions in voting rights cases.
D. Practice Before the Court
One of the principal complaints about three-judge district
courts before the 1976 amendment was the logistical nightmare
they created for judges and attorneys. For judges, it was incon-
venient to convene and to deliberate from scattered locations.
There was also the awkwardness, especially during trial, of
three judges ruling on evidentiary points or other discrete
issues. For attorneys, cases often had to be tried in a hurried
fashion in an injunction-like atmosphere. From the perspective
of individual cases, circumstances apparently have not changed
much since 1976. Inconvenience for all involved is often the rule,
not the exception.25 6 The difference, of course, is system-wide.
Since 1976, the burdens of the three-judge court upon the lower
federal court jurists and bar, as a whole, have been considerably
lessened.
Confusion remains, however, with respect to the cases litigat-
ed today. As discussed earlier, these cases raise complicated
evidentiary and legal issues.25 7 Procedural uncertainty and
confusion, which often characterized pre-1976 three-judge court
litigation,2 ' continues in many instances. For example, it is not
entirely clear whether a single member of such a tribunal has
authority, acting alone, to grant or deny motions, and whether
such rulings are appealable to the circuit court or to the
despite earlier Republican support for majority-minority districts, the Committee filed
an amicus brief in Shaw v. Reno "urging the position ultimately advanced by Justice
O'Connor" in her majority opinion).
This Article uses the term "partisan" in the narrow sense of advancing the election
prospects of one's own party. One might find seemingly partisan voting patterns among
judges even if these votes are opposed to their actual ideological positions, i.e., opposition
to race-conscious public programs. Based on ideology, Republican appointees might be
more likely to oppose such programs, and Democratic appointees less likely, regardless
of any partisan advantage gained or lost.
256. See, e.g., Karlan, supra note 75, at 264 (describing the first wave of the
Voinovich litigation as "an extremely expedited process in which [the district court] gave
each party three hours to present its evidence").
257. See supra notes 88-92 and accompanying text.
258. See supra notes 37-38 and accompanying text.
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Supreme Court.259 Relatedly, litigation over the same controver-
sy may be split among different forums, given the potential
combination of private and preclearance enforcement.26 °
IV. REFORMS
Dissatisfaction with the three-judge district court led to the
reforms embodied in the 1976 amendment to § 2284. This Part
of the Article considers whether developments since that time
support further revisitation of the statute.
A. Structural Issues
The most important issue regarding the three-judge district
court is whether it should exist at all. In the 1960s and 1970s,
there were frequent, though by no means unanimous, calls for
the institution to be abolished altogether. Instead, a compromise
was struck, whereby the court was limited to hearing reappor-
tionment and, indirectly, related Voting Rights Act cases.26 1 The
compromise seems to have drawn strength from the symbolic
power of the apparent greater fairness of such courts in civil
rights cases-a power, no doubt, predicated in part on the
experience of those courts in the South in the early 1960s.
Whatever the efficacy of these courts three decades ago, their
virtues are questionable today. As detailed in Parts II and III
of this Article, the advantages of three-judge district courts-
greater deliberation, better systemic results, more rapid Su-
preme Court review-are modest indeed. Virtually all benefits
could be attained in the single-judge, normal appellate review
model, with an expedited process added. Today, such courts do
259. See WRIGHT ET AL., supra note 20, § 4235, at 614-16, 621-26.
260. See, e.g., Morse v. Republican Party, 116 S. Ct. 1186 (1996). In Morse, a majority
of the Court authorized a private action to enforce sections 5 and 10 of the Voting Rights
Act, 42 U.S.C. §§ 1973c, 1973h, filed before a three-judge district court in the Western
District of Virginia, while acknowledging that other claims under the Act would be
considered by a single-judge district court. See 116 S. Ct. at 1192 & n.4. The Court also
recognized that other and related aspects of the case might be subject to preclearance
litigation before the United States District Court for the District of Columbia. See id.
at 1209.
261. See 28 U.S.C. § 2284(a) (1994); see also supra Part I.B.
Voting Rights and Three-Judge District Courts 127
have a symbolic value of sorts. To the extent that anyone, inside
or outside the legal community, really pays attention, there is
perhaps some added value to having three judges, including at
least one appellate jurist, hear the case at the outset. The same
observer might discount that value if she knew that, in most
cases, Supreme Court review consists of a summary affirmance.
But there is often symbolism of another kind, much of it, in
my view, in the wrong direction. A modern premise of these
courts, informed by the historical origins, is to provide a balance
of judges of different political backgrounds to hear cases of
admittedly enormous influence for the states' political systems.
That premise is understandable but weak on several grounds.
Empirically, it wrongly assumes that federal judges cannot put
aside their personal political beliefs and are motivated by overt
partisanship. More importantly, even if that assumption is true
for some judges in some cases, it sends the wrong signal. It
tells the public that a federal judge is simply another political
actor, rather than a neutral decisionmaker attempting to
enforce even-handed principles of laws. The message, it seems,
has already been received. In voting rights cases, the media
often routinely report the political background of the judges in
question. 262 Almost always, journalists report the affiliation
262. See, e.g., Albert R. Hunt, Racial Redistricting Hurts African-Americans, WALL
ST. J., Dec. 21, 1995, at A15 (reporting the political affiliation of the district judge
presiding over the remand of Miller v. Johnson, 115 S. Ct. 2475 (1995)); Kevin Sack,
Georgia Tries to Redraw Voting Map Based on Race, N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 15, 1995, at A12
(same); Kevin Sack, Court Draws Georgia Map of Congressional Districts, N.Y. TIMES,
Dec. 14, 1995, at A22 (same); Ronald Smothers, U.S. District Court Upholds "Gerry-
mander" for Blacks, N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 3, 1994, at A12 (reporting political affiliations of
judges in Shaw v. Hunt, 861 F. Supp. 408 (E.D.N.C. 1994)); Thomas Suddes, Eight
House Seats in Latest Remap Skirmish, CLEVELAND PLAIN DEALER, Aug. 16, 1995, at
B5 (reporting political affiliations of judges in Quilter v. Voinovich, 912 F. Supp. 1006
(N.D. Ohio 1995)).
To be sure, the media often appear to report political affiliations of judges in other
high-profile cases not involving voting rights. See, e.g., Paul M. Barrett, Paula Jones
Suit Receives Go-Ahead From a U.S. Court, WALL ST. J., Jan. 10, 1996, at B6 (report-
ing the political affiliations of the three-judge panel in Jones v. Clinton, 72 F.3d 1354
(8th Cir.), cert. granted, 116 S. Ct. 2545 (1996)); Jo Thomas, Appeals Court Removes
Judge in Oklahoma Bombing Case, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 2, 1995, at 6 (reporting the
political affiliations of the three-judge panel in the Tenth Circuit case that ordered
recusal of the trial judge in the Oklahoma City bombing case, Nichols v. Alley, 71 F.3d
347 (10th Cir. 1995) (per curiam)).
I am not aware of any empirical study of this point, but my sense is that the
reporting of such affiliations of judges is increasing. Perhaps it is a function of the
reporter's belief that such affiliations have explanatory force for the court's decision.
See RICHARD DAVIS, DECISIONS AND IMAGES: THE SUPREME COURT AND THE PRESS 146
(1994) (citing a survey of reporters who cover the U.S. Supreme Court indicating that
"[tiwo-thirds felt a justice's personal ideology is a very important factor in decision
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without any sort of indication of why it might be relevant-as
though its importance is self-evident. In voting rights cases,
perhaps even more than other cases, it is of paramount impor-
tance that judicial review be far removed from the vicissitudes
of partisan politics.26 Making judicial review non-partisan in
form as well as content will insure that the distance is main-
tained.264
Today, just as in the days of the old Fifth Circuit, there will
be the occasional parochial and hostile federal judge. The cure
for the problem lies not in creating and manipulating three-
judge courts, but in having the circuit court reverse the judge.
The litigants will still be heard and perhaps vindicated, but
without the unseemly and unnecessary political overtones of
the three-judge court.
It would seem, then, there is a good case to be made for
simply abolishing the three-judge district court. If the court is
to be retained, then its jurisdiction should be limited, as now,
to reapportionment and related Voting Rights Act cases. As
suggested in Part II, there appears to be some consensus that
making"); Linda Greenhouse, Telling the Court's Story: Justice and Journalism at the
Supreme Court, 105 YALE L.J. 1537, 1557 (1996) (relating that the New York Times
only names the President who appointed a judge "if such identification makes sense as
a news judgment in the context of a specific story," as routine identification would be
"insinuating that all federal judges are simply carrying out the agendas of their
political sponsors").
263. See Frederick Schauer, Judicial Review of the Devices of Democracy, 94
COLUM. L. REV. 1326, 1336-37 (1994) ("Because substantive agendas might thus distort
procedural decision making, issues of democratic procedure are best decided by a
strategy of precommitment that immunizes procedural decisions most influenced by
immediate political agendas from modification in the service of constantly changing
political forces."); see also Bush v. Vera, 116 S. Ct. 1941, 1991 (1996) (Stevens, J.,
dissenting) ("Given the uniquely political nature of the redistricting process, I fear the
impact [that the application of Shaw v. Reno and its progeny by the federal courts] will
have on the public's perception of the impartiality of the federal judiciary.").
264. It is merely to state a truism that considerable dangers attend the overt
politicization of any judicial system. See Gregory A. Caldeira & James L. Gibson, The
Etiology of Public Support for the Supreme Court, 36 AM. J. POL. SCi. 635 (1992);
Steven P. Croley, The Majoritarian Difficulty: Elective Judiciaries and the Rule of Law,
62 U. CHI. L. REV. 689 (1995); Marvin E. Frankel, Political Demagoguery Threatens
Judiciary, NAT'L L.J., Apr. 15, 1996, at A23. For the reasons advanced in the text, I do
not think that explicitly staffing three-judge district courts on the basis of the partisan
background of the judges would, or should, lead to greater public acceptance of the
decisions. The opposite might well be true. But see Albert W. Alschuler, Racial Quotas
and the Jury, 44 DUKE L.J. 704, 718-19 (1995) (arguing in favor of race-conscious jury
selection in order to enhance public acceptance of jury rulings). See also Bush, 116 S.
Ct. at 2001 n.5 (Souter, J., dissenting) (arguing that "racial balance in jury selection"
should not be required since there are "differences between jury decisionmaking and
political decisionmaking").
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those types of cases are indeed important, deserving special
treatment, given the centrality of voting to a democracy. Why
not, then, place all cases raising voting rights issues before a
three-judge court? This would prove too much. In some sense,
of course, all voting cases are important, but only the sort of
state-wide voting cases currently before such courts affect states
as states. Federalism concerns are less weighty with regard to
more geographically discrete voting cases. Moreover, apportion-
ment is "one of the most conflictual forms of regular politics in
the United States short of violence. 265 That, coupled with the
recent prominence of certain Voting Rights Act cases, suggests
that these are cases that stand qualitatively apart from other
cases raising voting issues.
Thus, there is no point in expanding the jurisdiction of the
court.266 That is just what was proposed in legislation before the
104th Congress. One bill would have required a three-judge
district court to be convened to hear a constitutional challenge
to a state law adopted by referendum or initiative.267 The
265. Andrew Gelman & Gary King, Enhancing Democracy Through Legislative
Redistricting, 88 AM. POL. Sci. REV. 541, 541 (1994).
Political gerrymanders could be, to some extent, self-correcting. That is, in efforts to
ensure their own re-elections, the members of the majority party in charge of apportion-
ment may (perhaps unintentionally) pack their own districts too much, dilute their
strength elsewhere, and eventually adversely affect their partisan, and incumbent,
advantage. There is empirical evidence that such self-correction occurs. See WILLIAM
N. ESKRIDGE, JR. & PHILIP P. FRICKEY, LEGISLATION: STATUTES AND THE CREATION OF
PUBLIC POLICY 165-66 (2d ed. 1995) (discussing unsuccessful efforts of Indiana
Republicans to effect a partisan gerrymander in the state legislature); LOWENSTEIN,
supra note 13, at 121; Gelman & King, supra, at 553-54 (studying apportionment of all
state legislative bodies from 1968 to 1988); Donald Ostdiek, Congressional Redistricting
and District Typologies, 57 J. POL. 533 (1995) (showing this effect in a study of four
states). If self-correction occurs, does it follow that there is less (or no) need for judicial
oversight? And does it further follow that there is less need for a three-judge district
court to adjudicate disputes over apportionment?
The case for less judicial oversight has not been made convincingly. While the case
for self-correcting gerrymanders appears compelling, the possibility and actuality of
subsequent court review may play a role in the process. A recent major study advancing
the self-correction thesis acknowledges this point, see Gelman & King, supra, at 543-44,
but does not study independently the phenomenon of "court-imposed plans, [because]
many courts (especially state courts) are widely known to be very partisan." See id. at
558 n.8. That is, courts are treated as simply another partisan actor in the gerryman-
dering process. I have attempted in this Article to refute that assumption on both
empirical and normative grounds. Moreover, it is not clear how the self-correction model
applies, if at all, to gerrymandering for reasons other than partisanship (i.e., race). Cf.
Issacharoff, supra note 77 (arguing that judicial review of partisan gerrymandering is
unworkable, but that judicial review ex ante of the process of redistricting is feasible).
266. An amendment to § 2284 to clarify pendent jurisdiction over federal claims
might be advisable. See supra Part II.A.
267. See H.R. 1117, 104th Cong. § 1(a) (1995).
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legislative history was virtually a repeat of that which attended
the initial creation of the court in response to Ex parte Young.
Asserting the "rise in [the] use of popular referenda by
states,"26 it argued that a "single federal judge" should not
have the power to "estop the enforcement of the direct will of
the people of a State . ,,."9 Moreover, the sponsors contended,
the use of such courts would ameliorate forum shopping and
will "recognize[ the obvious truth that no matter how objective
a judge may attempt to be, her predilections will necessarily
influence her decisions, especially when addressing matters of
constitutional policy."2 7° The sponsors added that the bill was
not particularly revolutionary, because challenges to referenda
are as important as reapportionment and Voting Rights Act
cases currently before three-judge district courts.27'
Another bill in the 104th Congress, the Prison Litigation
Reform Act, limited the ability of federal courts to issue
injunctive relief in suits filed by prisoners challenging the
conditions of their confinement and was enacted as a rider to
the appropriations bill for the Department of Justice for the
1996 fiscal year.272 A relatively obscure provision of the Prison
Litigation Reform Act requires that when any such prisoner
suit seeks the release of prisoners as one form of relief, a three-
judge district court must convene to hear the suit.273 The moti-
vation for the latter provision is obscure 2 4 but presumably it
268. H.R. REP. No. 104-179, at 4 (1995).
269. Id.
270. Id. at 6.
271. See id. at 5. The bill was passed by the House of Representatives on September
28, 1995, by a 266-159 vote. See House Passes Bill to Require 3 Judges on Ballot Issues,
53 CONG. Q. 3011, 3011 (1995). The Senate, however, took no substantive action on the
bill.
272. Prison Litigation Reform Act of 1995, Pub. L. No. 104-134, 110 Stat. 1321-66
(1996) (to be codified as amended at 18 U.S.C. § 3626 and scattered sections of 18
U.S.C.). The legislation, among other things, requires courts in suits seeking release of
prisoners to grant prospective relief only if the relief is narrowly drawn, if no less
intrusive means are available, giving substantial weight to "public safety" concerns. See
Prison Litigation Reform Act, 110 Stat. 1321, § 802, § 3626(a)(1)-(2). It also places
limits on the duration of decrees, and broadens the ability of state officials to challenge
such relief. See id. § 3626(b).
273. 18 U.S.C. § 3626(a)(3).
274. The conference report accompanying H.R. 2076, the earlier, vetoed version of
the Prison Litigation Reform Act, simply repeated the three-judge district court
provision without elaboration. See H.R. CONF. REP. No. 104-378, at 166 (1995). The
conference report accompanying the bill the President later signed says nothing
substantively about the Act, and indicates that unless otherwise stated it is incorpo-
rating by reference the conference report on the earlier, vetoed bill. See H.R. CONF. REP.
No. 104-537, at 397-98 (1996).
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is animated by the same concerns that drove the bill that
addressed concerns over federal court enjoining a referendum.
That is, in an era of perception of rising crime and of increasing
prison populations, suits that seek federal judicial interference
into state attempts to address this serious problem raise partic-
ularly important federalism concerns." 5 Thus, the argument
would run, such releases should only occur under the more
careful treatment afforded by three federal judges, rather than
just one.
276
Congress should not increase the use of three-judge district
courts. To be sure, the rationales of the drafters of these bills
do not completely lack force. Federal court challenges to state-
wide referenda raise important federalism concerns, and proba-
bly resonate with the public more than the type of cases now
before three-judge district courts. Although courts should
undertake scrutiny of such processes with care, it does not follow
that the issues raised by these cases require the use of a three-
judge district court. The sponsor of the bill was a Republican
member of the California Congressional delegation 27 8 who
275. See Lewis v. Casey, 116 S. Ct. 2174, 2185 (1996).
276. The Seventh Circuit addressed such concerns in Oliver v. Deen, 77 F.3d 156 (7th
Cir. 1996):
The role of the federal courts in regard to conditions of confinement in state
prisons is an uneasy one. Conditions in prisons in Arkansas, Alabama, and
Mississippi led federal judges in the late 1960's to forge legal tools to alleviate
deplorable, almost unimaginable situations. From a pioneering attempt to protect
inmates, who, for instance, because they feared forcible sexual violence and
stabbings spent nights clinging to the bars, a body of law has emerged in which
inmates sue their keepers for countless alleged deprivations, ranging from being
maced to complaints about the kind of music piped into cellblocks. The improve-
ment of many of the conditions of which prisoners complain would, in the view of
some, constitute enlightened policy. But that's not the issue. The issue for the
federal courts is, of course, determining the level of deprivation which can
reasonably be said to implicate the Constitution and thus become the business of
a federal judge. Drawing some hard lines is very important, not just for the courts
but, in the long run, for the prisoners also. The number of suits has proliferated
to the point that both Congress and the courts have begun to look for ways to
curb--or even eliminate-prison litigation. The more federal courts intrude
themselves into the prisons on minor matters, the more likely they are to be
evicted altogether, leaving prisoners to the extremes of the political climate.
Id. at 157 (footnotes omitted).
277. See Lynn A. Baker, Direct Democracy and Discrimination: A Public Choice
Perspective, 67 CHI.-KENT L. REV. 707, 711-12 (1991) (arguing that ballot initiative cases
do not raise more complicated constitutional claims than in other types of constitutional
cases).
278. The bill was introduced by Representative Sonny Bono and 40 other Republican
members of Congress. See 141 CONG. REC. H2892 (daily ed. Mar. 8, 1995).
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expressed concern about one federal district judge, a Democratic
appointee,279 enjoining the effect of California's anti-immigration
initiative, Proposition 187.280 If the judge's decision is wrong, it
can and should be reversed by the Ninth Circuit. Appellate
review of the district judge's decision can be accomplished in an
expeditious manner, and it is overkill to resurrect the unwieldy
machinery of the three-judge district court to deal with the
unhappy circumstance of the plaintiff in a particular case having
successfully forum-shopped.28' Judicial review of such referenda
can involve fact-intensive inquiries pertaining to the intent of
the voters,28 2 and it is by no means clear that a panel of three
federal judges is in any better position to make such inquiries
as compared to a single district judge.283 For similar reasons,
requiring three-judge panels to convene to hear certain types of
prisoner litigation is unwise. No compelling evidence shows that
federal trial judges, acting alone, abuse their power in a system-
ic way in considering such cases. Incorrect decisions, of course,
279. District Judge Mariana R. Pfaelzer (C.D. Cal.) is an appointee of President
Jimmy Carter. See 920 F. Supp. xxi (1996) (listing the date of Judge Pfaelzer's appoint-
ment).
280. For a description of the early stages of the litigation, including the grant of
injunctive relief, see League of United Latin Am. Citizens v. Wilson, 908 F. Supp. 755,
763-64 (C.D. Cal. 1995). For more on the genesis of the bill, see H.R. REP. No. 104-179,
at 17-18 (1995) (dissenting views), and Jeanne Ponessa, Under Bill, Some Injunctions
Would Require Three Judges, 53 CONG. Q. 1428, 1428 (May 20, 1995).
A sequence of events similar to the litigation of the constitutionality of Proposition
187 recently played out with regard to the constitutionality of Proposition 209 (amending
state constitution to prohibit state's use of racial and other preferences) passed by the
voters of California in November of 1996. See Coalition for Economic Equality v. Wilson,
No. C96-4024TEH, 1996 WL 734682 (N.D. Cal. Dec. 23, 1996) (granting preliminary
injunction against enforcement of Proposition 209). The District Judge in the case,
Thelton E. Henderson, is a Carter appointee.
281. See Measures Passed by State Referendum: Hearing on H.R. 1170 before the
Subcomm. on Courts and Intellectual Property of the House Comm. on the Judiciary,
104th Cong. 24-26 (1995) (testimony of Harry T. Edwards, C.J., U.S. Court of Appeals
for the District of Columbia); id. at 12-13 (prepared statement of L. Ralph Mecham,
Secretary, Judicial Conference of the United States); H.R. REP. No. 104-179, at 15-17
(1995) (dissenting views).
282. See Jane S. Schacter, The Pursuit of "Popular Intent": Interpretive Dilemmas
in Direct Democracy, 105 YALE L.J. 107, 123-26 (1995) (describing the difficulties for
courts that attempt to ascertain the intent of all of the supporters of a statewide
initiative); Gail Diane Cox, Lawmaking by Amateurs, NAT'L L.J., Oct. 23, 1995, at Al,
A25 (describing the problem with badly drafted referenda); see, e.g., Romer v. Evans,
116 S. Ct. 1620, 1627-28 (1996) (finding state referendum violative of Equal Protection
Clause due in part to its expression of animus toward homosexuals).
283. Cf Equality Found. of Greater Cincinnati, Inc. v. City of Cincinnati, 54 F.3d
261, 270-71 (6th Cir. 1995) (reversing district judge's decision enjoining enforcement
of anti-gay rights referendum and ruling that some findings of fact by trial judge were
erroneous), vacated, 116 S. Ct. 2519 (1996).
Voting Rights and Three-Judge District Courts 133
can be reversed through the normal appellate process. Moreover,
both bills set an unfortunate precedent for piecemeal expansion
of the three-judge district court.28 4
A final structural reform to be considered is the availability
and scope of direct review by the Supreme Court. If, as this
Article argues above, the three-judge court should be abolished,
then the issue is moot. If, however, the court is retained, then
alternatives should be considered seriously. One alternative
would be first to lodge review, as in all other cases, with the
circuit court of appeals, with certiorari review then available in
the Supreme Court. Another alternative might be to replace the
current review scheme with an explicit certiorari model. Still
another may be to retain the current structure but have the
Court at least briefly explain its summary dispositions.285 In my
view, the current scheme of review is problematic, and the first
of the suggested alternatives is the best solution. It would retain
the three-judge district court, for whatever virtues it may have,
but place it squarely back in the basic organizational scheme of
the federal court system. The Supreme Court could still hear
such cases, of course, through the writ of certiorari. Expedited
appeals, admittedly important to consider in most voting rights
cases, could be provided by using existing rules and statutes
28 6
or incorporated in a revised § 1253. The need for expedited
review might be overstated because "[e]rroneous judicial rulings
284. An even more egregious use of three-judge courts occurred in the late 1970s.
Senator James McClure, Republican of Idaho, was upset that President Carter had
nominated Democratic Representative Abner Mikva to serve on the D.C. Circuit. Part
of the ostensible reason for Senator McClure's opposition was that the appointment
allegedly would violate the Ineligibility Clause, U.S. CONST. art. I, § 6, cl. 2, because
Mikva had voted for a pay increase for federal judges. Senator McClure managed to get
a law passed, Act of Oct. 12, 1979, Pub. L. No. 96-86, § 101(c), 93 Stat. 656, which stated
that any constitutional challenge by a member of Congress to an appointment to the
D.C. Circuit on Ineligibility Clause grounds (obviously referring to the McClure-Mikva
clash without mentioning either name) could only be brought before a three-judge
district court. As a nice example of forum-shopping, Senator McClure brought the action
in Idaho, but lost for lack of standing. McClure v. Carter, 513 F. Supp. 265 (D. Idaho),
affd mem. sub nom. McClure v. Reagan, 454 U.S. 1025 (1981).
The story is farcical but not because the constitutional issue raised by McClure is
frivolous. See Michael Stokes Paulsen, Is Lloyd Bentsen Unconstitutional?, 46 STAN. L.
REV. 907, 908 (1994) (arguing that the Emolument Clause of Article I, Section 6 should
be enforced to disqualify appointments that violate it). Rather, it seems preposterous
that a single federal district judge, either in the District of Columbia or Idaho, could not
hear the case, with usual appellate review thereafter.
285. See STERN ET AL., supra note 128, at 220 (arguing that doing so would ease
confusion over these cases among lawyers and lower federal courts).
286. See, e.g., 28 U.S.C. § 1657 (1988) (requiring actions for preliminary injunctive
relief to be expedited).
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are no more (or less) disruptive in the election context than in
other areas."287 The other alternatives are less convincing. The
Court is already, through Rule 18,288 following the certiorari
model, and the suggestion to embellish mere summary disposi-
tions seems at odds with a summary process in the first in-
stance.
B. Administrative Issues
Part III of this Article considered issues primarily regarding
the internal operation of three-judge district courts. Three
aspects of those issues-the composing of the three judges, the
mixing of trial and appellate jurists, and the purportedly
ideological voting on such courts-are worth revisiting.
Section 2284 frees chiefjudges of circuits to create three-judge
courts with one or two district judges. It also leaves them open
to charges of "packing" the courts. This Article has argued in
favor of at least striving for the goal of depoliticizing such
courts.289 To achieve that purpose, circuits should establish a
blind rotation system to staff such courts, much as panels of
circuit judges are usually assembled. The preference would be
for judges from the state in question. Given the typical mix of
trial and appellate issues in much three-judge court litigation,
having at least one circuit judge on the panel is not irrational.
Nonetheless, the better course is to have the court consist of
three trial judges, making it a true three-judge district court.
Little evidence supports the notion that circuit judges exert
undue influence over their district court counterparts. Yet the
additional acumen and prestige lent by a circuit judge does not
seem appropriate for a hearing consisting of a large measure of
trial-type issues. Moreover, district judges are no strangers to
the type of legal issues in which appellate jurists specialize.
287. ESTREICHER &SEXTON, supra note 180, at 68-69; see also id. at 117-18 (arguing
that all mandatory appeals should be abolished).
Given the normative importance of elections, the need for timely finality is perhaps
higher in the three-judge district court context. If so, then (1) limited or even no appeal
rights might be justified, and (2) collective decisionmaking for a de facto final decision
is more justified. By fully reviewing only a few three-judge court cases, the Supreme
Court arguably is following this model. That might be so, but in my view the model is
in need of adjustment.
288. See supra notes 172-76.
289. See supra Part IVA.
Voting Rights and Three-Judge District Courts 135
Having three district judges is particularly appropriate if, as
argued above, direct Supreme Court review is eliminated.
A final and related concern is the ideological make-up of the
three-judge district court. Some chief judges, quite under-
standably, have attempted to balance the panel with both
Democratic and Republican appointees. Indeed, at one point
Henry J. Friendly, then Chief Judge of the Second Circuit,
virtually argued that the mixed partisan background should be
institutionalized. 29' This requirement is not unknown in the
federal administrative structure. 2 1 Although understandable,
this benign packing sends the wrong message. If three-judge
courts are retained, and assignments thereto are made on a
more-or-less random basis, then we should permit the partisan
chips to fall where they may. Judge Tuttle's packing of these
courts three decades ago was perhaps, in hindsight, not a bad
thing. But circumstances in the deep South and elsewhere have
changed. The need for partisan packing, if there ever was such
a need, is far less now and does not outweigh the negative image
created by the politicization of three-judge district courts.
CONCLUSION
The three-judge district court has had a rich political history
and has served an important, unappreciated, and at times useful
service to the federal court system. Nonetheless, by the 1970s
its limitations clearly outweighed its virtues, and Congress was
right to limit the jurisdiction of such courts to voting rights
290. See Jacoby, supra note 49, at 39 ("'Despite my distaste for three-judge courts
.... [iut is more acceptable if such cases are heard by a court whose members include
adherents of more than one political party.'" (quoting Congressional testimony of
Friendly, J., Hearings, supra note 52, at 749)).
291. See, e.g., 2 U.S.C. § 437c(a)(1) (1994) (requiring that no more than three
members of six-person Federal Elections Commission be from one political party); 15
U.S.C. § 41 (1994) (requiring same with respect to the five-member Federal Trade
Commission); 15 U.S.C. § 78d(a) (1994) (requiring that no more than three members of
the five-person Securities and Exchange Commission be from one political party). The
statute creating the National Labor Relations Board (NLRB), 29 U.S.C. § 153 (1994),
has no such requirement, and, perhaps not coincidentally, presidents have long been
accused of packing the NLRB with partisan appointments. See, e.g., PETER W. Low &
JOHN C. JEFFRIES, JR., FEDERAL COURTS AND THE LAW OF FEDERAL-STATE RELATIONS
162 & n.e (3d ed. 1994). This charge is perhaps accentuated by the fact that the NLRB
engages in far more adjudication (and much less rulemaking) than other federal
administrative agencies. See id. (arguing that the partisan nature of the Board
contributes to this trend).
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cases. In some ways, restriction to voting rights cases has only
accentuated the problematic aspects of these courts. For that
reason, Congress should seriously consider abolishing these
courts. If it does not, Congress and the federal judiciary should
give equally serious thought to reform, particularly the process
of selecting members of such courts. If that occurs, the three-
judge district court might truly live up to its original promise
of a fair and impartial forum to consider important and contro-
versial cases in our nation.
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TABLE 1
THREE-JUDGE DISTRICT COURT HEARINGS, 1964-1994
CIVIL
YEAR RIGHTS* REAPPORTIONMENT OTHER TOTAL
1964 21 18 80 119
1965 35 17 95 147
1966 40 28 94 162
1967 55 10 106 171
1968 55 6 118 179
1969 81 1 133 215
1970 162 8 121 291
1971 176 2 140 318
1972 166 32 112 310
1973 183 7 130 320
1974 171 8 70 249
1975 192 9 66 267
1976 161 5 42 208
1977 59 6 47 112
1978 20 3 34 67
1979 15 3 12 30
1980 25 4 4 33
1981 31 1 3 35
1982 19 42 1 62
1983 16 9 2 27
1984 16 17 2 35
1985 8 2 0 10
1986 14 1 3 18
1987 19 2 0 21
1988 10 5 0 15
1989 8 0 0 9
1990 9 0 0 9
1991 13 1 0 14
1992 17 33 0 50
1993 9 7 0 16
1994 14 11 0 25
Sources: following Tables from the Annual Report of the Director of the Administrative
Office of the U.S. Courts. 1976 Annual Report, Table 37; 1980 Annual Report, Table 54;
1985 Annual Report, Table S-9; 1991 Annual Report, Table S-9; 1993 Annual Report, Table
S-9; 1994 Annual Report, Table S-20.
*After 1976, Tables break 'Civil Rights" category into "Voting Rights" and various other categories.
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TABLE 2
ORALLY ARGUED THREE-JUDGE COURT CASES ON
SUPREME COURT'S DOCKET, 1953-1993 TERMS
Term 1953 1954 1955 1956 1957 1958 1959___J 5 15 8 12712
% 4.4 3.8 10.1 4.6 5.3 3.8 6.7
Term 1960 1961 1962 1963 1964 1965 1966 1967 1968 1969
# 9 18 34 31 22 15 29 26 36 36
% 5.3 11.6 14.5 16.7 14.3 8.8 15.3 10.6 18.3 22.7
Term 1970 1971 1972 1973 1974 1975 1976 1977 1978 1979
# 41 41 59 42 56 51 65 22 26 13
% 23.9 19.2 27.1 17.8 25.3 22.4 29.1 10.5 13.0 6.4
Term 1980 1981 1982 1983_ 1984 1985 1986 1987 1988 1989
# 4 1 3 3 149 1318 . 1213 1 0 0 5 .
% 1.8 10.4 I 1.2 I 1.2 1. . 03,0,0 ,0
Term 1990 1991 1992 1993
# 11617 5
% 0.6 3.6 J5.0 4.6
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TABLE 3
MEMBERSHIP CHARACTERISTICS OF SELECTED
PUBLISHED CASES, 1976-1994
Cases with two District Judges and one Circuit Judge 84
Cases with two Circuit Judges and one District Judge 5
Cases with one Judge not from State 14
Cases with two Judges not from State 1
TABLE 4
DECISIONMAKING CHARACTERISTICS OF SELECTED
PUBLISHED CASES, 1976-1994
Per Curiam Opinions 32
Joint Opinions 8
Majority Opinions by Circuit Judge 23
Majority Opinions by District Judge 26
Concurring Opinions by Circuit Judges 3
Concurring Opinions by District Judges 12
Dissenting Opinions by Circuit Judges 6
Dissenting Opinions by District Judges 16
FALL 1996]
140 University of Michigan Journal of Law Reform [VOL. 30:1
TABLE 5
PARTISAN CHARACTERISTICS OF PANELS DECIDING
SELECTED PUBLISHED CASES, 1976-1994
3-0 Democratic: plaintiff wins: 12 loses: 2
2-1 Democratic: plaintiff wins: 20 loses: 6
1-2 Democratic: plaintiff wins: 8 loses: 12
0-3 Democratic: plaintiff wins: 10 loses: 2
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APPENDIX
PUBLISHED THREE-JUDGE DISTRICT COURT CASES,
1976-1994
Lopez v. Monterey County, 871 F. Supp. 1254 (N.D. Cal. 1994).
Texas v. United States, 866 F. Supp. 20 (D.D.C. 1994), aff'd
mem., 115 S. Ct. 1397 (1995).
Johnson v. Miller, 864 F. Supp. 1354 (S.D. Ga. 1994) (per curi-
am), prob. juris. noted, 115 S. Ct. 713, aff'd, 115 S. Ct. 2475
(1995).
Shaw v. Hunt, 861 F. Supp. 408 (E.D.N.C. 1994), prob. juris.
noted, 115 S. Ct. 2639 (1995), rev'd, 116 S. Ct. 1894 (1996).
Vera v. Richards, 861 F. Supp. 1304 (S.D. Tex. 1994), prob.
juris. noted sub nom. Bush v. Vera, 115 S. Ct. 2639 (1995),
aff'd, 116 S. Ct. 1941 (1996).
Hays v. Louisiana, 862 F. Supp. 119 (W.D. La.), prob. juris.
noted sub nom. United States v. Hays, 115 S. Ct. 687 (1994),
vacated, 115 S. Ct. 2431 (1995).
NAACP v. Austin, 857 F. Supp. 560 (E.D. Mich. 1994).
DeWitt v. Wilson, 856 F. Supp. 1409 (E.D. Cal. 1994), aff'd in
part, dismissed in part mem., 115 S. Ct. 2637 (1995).
Morse v. Oliver North for United States Senate Comm., Inc.,
853 F. Supp. 212 (W.D. Va. 1994), prob. juris. noted sub
nom. Morse v. Republican Party, 115 S. Ct. 932 (1995), rev'd,
116 S. Ct. 1186 (1996).
Marylanders for Fair Representation, Inc. v. Schaefer, 849 F.
Supp. 1022 (D. Md. 1994).
Mack v. Russell County Comm'r, 840 F. Supp. 869 (M.D. Ala.
1993).
Brooks v. State Bd. of Elections, 838 F. Supp. 601 (S.D. Ga.
1993).
Rural W. Tenn. African-Am. Affairs Council, Inc. v. McWherter,
836 F. Supp. 447 (W.D. Tenn. 1993), aff'd mem. sub nom.
Millsaps v. Langsdon, 510 U.S. 1160 (1994).
Dupree v. Moore, 831 F. Supp. 1310 (S.D. Miss. 1993), vacated,
115 S. Ct. 1684 (1995).
Henderson v. Harris, 804 F. Supp. 288 (M.D. Ala. 1992).
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Holloway v. Hechler, 817 F. Supp. 617 (S.D. W.Va. 1992), aff'd
mem., 507 U.S. 956 (1993).
Lopez v. Hale County, 797 F. Supp. 547 (N.D. Tex. 1992), aff'd
mem., 506 U.S. 1042 (1993).
Shaw v. Barr, 808 F. Supp. 461 (E.D.N.C.), prob. juris. noted,
506 U.S. 1019 (1992), rev'd sub nom. Shaw v. Reno, 509 U.S.
630 (1993).
DeGrandy v. Wetherell, 815 F. Supp. 1550 (N.D. Fla. 1992),
prob. juris. noted, 507 U.S. 907 (1993), aff'd in part, rev'd in
part sub nom. Johnson v. DeGrandy, 512 U.S. 997 (1994).
Norman v. Cuomo, 796 F. Supp. 654 (N.D.N.Y. 1992).
Prosser v. Elections Bd., 793 F. Supp. 859 (W.D. Wis. 1992).
Good v. Austin, 800 F. Supp. 557 (E. & W.D. Mich. 1992).
Quilter v. Voinovich, 794 F. Supp. 760 (N.D. Ohio), prob. juris.
noted, 504 U.S. 954 (1992), rev'd, 507 U.S. 146 (1993).
Arizonans for Fair Representation v. Symington, 828 F. Supp.
684 (D. Ariz. 1992), aff'd mem. sub nom. Hispanic Chamber
of Commerce v. Arizonans for Fair Representation, 507 U.S.
968 (1993).
Burton on Behalf of Republican Party v. Sheheen, 793 F. Supp.
1329 (D.S.C. 1992), vacated sub nom. Statewide Reapportion-
ment Advisory Comm. v. Theodore, 113 S. Ct. 2954 (1993).
Lake v. State Bd. of Elections, 798 F. Supp. 1199 (M.D.N.C.
1992).
Wesch v. Hunt, 785 F. Supp. 1491 (S.D. Ala.), aff'd sub nom.
Camp v. Wesch, 504 U.S. 902 (1992).
Members of Cal. Democratic Congressional Delegation v. Eu,
790 F. Supp. 925 (N.D. Cal. 1992), rev'd, Benavidez v. Eu, 34
F.3d 825 (9th Cir. 1994).
Texas v. United States, 785 F. Supp. 201 (D.D.C. 1992).
Emison v. Growe, 782 F. Supp. 427 (D. Minn.), prob. juris.
noted, 503 U.S. 958 (1992), rev'd, 507 U.S. 25 (1993).
Anne Arundel County Republican Cent. Comm. v. State Admin.
Bd. of Election Laws, 781 F. Supp. 394 (D. Ma. 1991), aff'd
mem., 504 U.S. 938 (1992).
Hastert v. State Bd. of Elections, 777 F. Supp. 634 (N.D. Ill.
1991).
Gorin v. Karpan, 775 F. Supp. 1430 (D. Wyo. 1991).
Armour v. Ohio, 775 F. Supp. 1044 (N.D. Ohio 1991).
Greene County Racing Comm'n v. City of Birmingham, 772 F.
Supp. 1207 (N.D. Ala. 1991), vacated sub nom. Harris v.
Birmingham, 505 U.S. 1201 (1992).
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Tisdale v. Sheheen, 777 F. Supp. 1270 (D.S.C.), vacated, 502
U.S. 932 (1991).
Dupree v. Moabus, 776 F. Supp. 290 (S.D. Miss. 1991), vacated
sub nom. Dupree v. Moore, 503 U.S. 930 (1992).
Hawthorne v. Baker, 750 F. Supp. 1090 (M.D. Ala. 1990),
vacated sub nom. State Democratic Executive Comm. v.
Hawthorne, 499 U.S. 933 (1991).
Brooks v. State Bd. of Elections, 775 F. Supp. 1470 (S.D. Ga.
1989), aff'd mem., 498 U.S. 916 (1990).
Gresham v. Harris, 695 F. Supp. 1179 (N.D. Ga. 1988), vacated
sub nom. Poole v. Gresham, 488 U.S. 978, aff'd, 495 U.S. 954
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